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While the majority of the population is now estimated to live in regions with below replacement fertility, high
fertility, poor reproductive health outcomes and relatively rapid population growth remain an important
concern in several low income countries. International and national spending devoted to family planning,
however, has declined significantly in recent years. Recent research has brought about a revision in the
understanding of the interactions between population growth and economic development, as well as the
effects of family planning programs in terms of reduced fertility, improved reproductive health outcomes and
other life-cycle and intergenerational consequences. This paper discusses recent evidence about the benefits of
family planning programs and the interactions between population growth and developments, and it attempts
to estimate benefit-cost ratios for increased spending on family planning.
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Hans-Peter Kohler∗
Revised version: June 4, 2012
1. THE CHALLENGE OF “POPULATION GROWTH”
While the majority of the population is now estimated to live in regions with below re-
placement fertility, high fertility, poor reproductive health outcomes and relatively rapid
population growth remain an important concern in several low income countries. Inter-
national and national spending devoted to family planning, however, has declined signif-
icantly in recent years. Recent research has brought about a revision in the understanding
of the interactions between population growth and economic development, as well as the
effects of family planning programs in terms of reduced fertility, improved reproductive
health outcomes and other life-cycle and intergenerational consequences. This paper dis-
cusses recent evidence about the benefits of family planning programs and the interactions
between population growth and developments, and it attempts to estimate benefit-cost
ratios for increased spending on family planning.1
2. THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION: AN UNFINISHED SUCCESS STORY
The demographic transition in developing countries during the 2nd half to the 20th century
is widely considered a “success story”. Between 1950–55 and 2005–10, the life expectancy in
less developed countries2 increased from 42.3 to 66 years (a total gain of 23.7 years, or an
average annual gain of .43 years), and in the least developed countries, it increased from
37.2 to 56.9 (a total gain of 19.7 years, or an average annual gain of .37 years). Fertility
rates declined from a total fertility rate (TFR) of about 6.1 in less developed countries in
1950–55 to 2.7 children per woman in 2005–10 (an annual decline of about 0.062), and TFR
levels declined from 6.5 to 4.4 children per woman in the least developed countries dur-
∗Kohler is Frederick J. Warren Professor of Demography, Department of Sociology and Population Stud-
ies Center, 3718 Locust Walk, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6299, USA; Email: hp-
kohler@pop.upenn.edu, Homepage: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/∼hpkohler. This paper is an updated version
of the paper distributed during the Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012 Conference in Copenhagen in May 2012.
In writing and revising this paper, I have greatly benefited from the useful and constructive comments by Jere
Behrman, John Cleland, David Lam, Odet Galor and James Walker. I gratefully acknowledge the useful feedback
from Kasper Thede Anderskov and other members of the Copenhagen Consensus Team, and I have also bene-
fited from discussions with Julio Romero Prieto, Arun Hendi and other students in Demog 796 at the Universtiy
of Pennsylvania.
1Following Bongaarts and Sinding (2011a), family planning is used to refer to programs that to provide in-
formation about contraception, as well as contraceptives themselves and related reproductive health services.
Such programs do not generally include abortion, and consensus statements produced by the UN explicitly ex-
clude abortion as a method of family planning. However, in some countries where abortion is legal, it is offered
alongside contraceptive information and services.
2Including least developed countries; the classification follows the UN Population Division grouping into
more developed countries, less developed countries, and least developed countries; where less developed coun-
tries include—unless otherwise noted—the least developed countries; see http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp for ad-
ditional information.
Hans-Peter Kohler
Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012
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Annual Growth Rates Word Population
6 Seven Billion and Growing: A 21st Century Perspective on Population
Figure 1 : The world population according to different projection 
variants, 1750-2100
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm
Figure 2 :Average annual rate of population change for the world 
according to different projection variants, 1750-2100
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm
Figure 3 :Estimated and projected total fertility for the world according to 
different projection variants, 1950-2100 (children per woman)
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm
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Figure 1: World population and annual growth rates of the world population according
to different UN projection variants
Note: The low, medium and high scenarios assume the same mortality trends, and differ in the level of fertility.
After 2010, the fertility levels in the different scenarios converge, and after 2015 the TFR in the high fertility
scenario is .5 above that of the medium scenario, and in the low fertility scenario, the TFR is .5 below that of the
medium scenario. In the medium scenario, global TFR declines from 2.52 (2010) to 2.03 in 2100.
Source: Global Aganda Council on Population Growth (2012), based on UN Population Division (2010c)
ing this time period (an annual decline of about 0.038). Global annual population growth
rates declined from a peak of 2.07% in 196 –70 to 1.16% in 2005–10 (Figure 1). The growth
rate in less developed countries also peaked during 1965–70 at about 2.5% per year, while
growth rates in the least developed countries peaked during 1990–95 at 2.75%. By 2005–
10, the growth rates declined to 1.33% and 2.21% respectively. The majority of the world
populati n is now estimated to live in regions with below replacement fertility (TFR≤ 2.1)
(Wilson 2004), and the global TFR is projected to reach 2.1—the onvent onal, albe t glob-
ally not necessarily correct marker for replacement level fertility (Espenshade et al. 2003;
Kohler and Ortega 2002)—by 2070 (UN median p ojection; UN Population Divisi n 2010c).
As a result of the increases in life expectancy and reductions in fertility, in many developed
countries—and increasingly also in some developing countries—concerns about very low
fertility and rapid population aging have emerged as important demographic concerns
(Kohler et al. 2002; Lee 2011), and some scholars have postulated that shrinking families
are “the new population problem” (Crouter and Booth 2005).
In less developed countries, rapid declines of mortality and fertility have often been
associated with rapid economic development. For example, in South Korea during 1950–
2010, life expectancy increased from 47.9 to 80 years, fertility (TFR) declined from 5.1 to
1.3 children per woman, and GDP per capita grew substantially with a growth rate of
more than 5% p.a. during 1960–2010. While often seen as a sufficient condition for fertility
decline (Figure 2), however, rapid economic development is not always a necessary con-
ditions: in Bangladesh during 1950–2010, for example, life expectancy increased from 45.3
to 67.8, fertility (TFR) declined from 6.4 to 2.4 children per woman, and GDP per capita
grew during 1960–2010 at an average rate of only 1.5% p.a. Both India and China saw large
fertility declines before the onset of rapid economic growth. Iran holds the record of the
most rapid decline in fertility from 6.5 to 1.8 during the period 1980–2010 when Iran was
a Islamic Republic and average economic growth was relatively modest at around 1.3%
p.a (see also Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2009a,b). During these diverse patterns of demographic
transitions that unfolded during the 2nd half of the 20th century, the world population
grew rapidly (Figure 1). The World population doubled from 1.5 to 3 billions in between
Hans-Peter Kohler
Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012
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Figure 2: Cross-sectional relationship between the total fertility rate (TFR) and the hu-
man development index (HDI) in 1975 and 2005
Note: The HDI is the primary index used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to monitor
and evaluate broadly-defined human development, combining with equal weight indicators of a country’s health
conditions, living standard and human capital. The HDI in this figure is recalculated using a time-invariant
formula so that it is longitudinally comparable between 1975–2005 (for a discussion, see Myrskylä et al. 2009).
There is a clear negative association in 1975 and 2005 between the level of human development (as measured by
the HDI) and the level of the total fertility rate, with a possible reversal of this correlation occurring in 2005 for
the most developed countries. In addition, there is important the heterogeneity in the 2005 fertility rates at the
various development stages. On the one hand, low fertility in 2005 is no longer restricted to the most developed
countries: TFR levels of below 2.1 are achieved at 2005 HDI levels as low as .7, and TFR levels of below 3.0 are
attained by countries at 2005 Human Development Index (HDI) levels of .55. On the other hand, fertility levels
vary widely for all but the highest levels of development. For example, countries with a 2005 HDI of .4–.6 exhibit
TFR levels ranging from 3 to 7.1 (mean is 4.7), and TFR levels range from 1.2 to 5.9 among countries with a 2005
HDI of .6–.8 (mean TFR is 2.6).
Source: Adapted from Myrskylä et al. (2009) and Kohler (2010)
the late 19th century and 1960, and it doubled again from 3 to 6 during 1960–99. The year
2011 marks the year when the world population has reached 7 billion persons, adding the
last 7th billion in merely 12 years—not unlike the time periods it took to add the 5th and
6th billion to the world population.3 However, despite the rapid population growth during
the last decades, the prominent doomsday prediction from the 1960s and 1970s about the
potentially disastrous consequences of rapid population growth did not materialize. Not
only did the world avoid the prominent predictions of major food crises and environmen-
tal degradation made in books such as “The Population Bomb” or “The Population Explosion”
(Ehrlich 1968; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990), but various measures of individual well-being in-
creased globally—including both in both more developed and less developed countries:
despite rapid population growth during 1960–2010 (Figure 1), global GDP per capita grew
from $2,376 to $5,997 (in constant 2000 US$) (+152%), life expectancy has increased from
51.2 to 67.9 years (+33%), infant and maternal death rates have declined substantially, level
3According to UN population estimates, the UN estimated that the world population reached 3 billions on 20
October 1959, 4 billions on 27 June 1974, 5 billions on 21 January 1987, 6 billion on 5 December 1998, and 7 Billions
on 31 October 2011 (see http://esa.un.org/wpp/Other-Information/pr_faq.htm); the time it took to add 4th, 5th,
6th and 7th billion is therefore 14.7, 12.6, 11.9, and 12.9 years respectively.
Hans-Peter Kohler
Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012
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World Sub-Saharan Africa
period first because concerns about food production continued to be voiced during
this period, including some pessimistic predictions for the 1980s. Lester Brown
argued in a 1981 Science article, “As the 1980s begin, the growth in world
production is losing momentum and its excess over population growth is narrowing”
(Brown 1981:1001). However, Fig. 4 shows no evidence of such a slowdown in the
1980s, and the growth of world food production continued to be impressive in the
following decades. Food production in 2009 was 3.1 times its 1961 level, while
population was 2.2 times its 1961 level, implying that that per capita food
production increased 41% between 1961 and 2009.
These numbers are for the world as a whole. It might be argued that the real
concern in the 1960s was with particular countries or regions. India was the focus of
a great deal of concern in the 1960s and was a particular focus in Ehrlich’s The
Population Bomb. He quoted the agricultural economist Louis Bean, who said, “My
examination of the trend of India’s grain production over the last 18 years leads me
to the conclusion that the present 1967–1968 production . . . is at a maximum level”
(Ehrlich 1968:41). This was one of the reasons Ehrlich and others predicted mass
starvation in India in the 1980s.
Figure 5 shows food production and population for India. Looking at the 1960s,
we see that the pessimistic predictions for India had some basis. India’s food
production was fairly flat through the mid-1960s, with per capita production falling
by 7% between 1961 and 1967. Around that time, Green Revolution hybrid seeds
were first used, leading to large increases in yields in the late 1960s (discussed in
more detail later in the article). Food production grew impressively in the 1970s and
1980s, and by 1990 was 2.3 times its 1961 level. India’s population also grew
rapidly during this period, reaching growth rates of 2.3% per year in the 1970s. Its
1990 population was 1.9 times the 1961 level. As a result, per capita food production
declined in the 1960s, remained roughly flat in the 1970s, and then rose in the
1980s. Per capita food production in 1990 was 20% higher than its 1961 level.
There were concerns in the late 1980s that the impressive gains of the Green
Revolution had played themselves out. In The Population Explosion, a 1990 sequel
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Fig. 4 World food production, 1961 to 2009. Data are from FAO (2011)
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releva t to this article. A corollary is that it is easy to look back and find inaccurate
predictions, especially from 40 to 50 years ago. We can all be glad that we didn’t
make any predictions for others to look back and scrutinize. But, as we’ll see in the
next section, some people’s predictions were a lot better than others’.
Resource Depletion
I now turn to the concern that rapid population growth would cause depletion of
essential nonrenewable resources. To economists, the best place to look for evidence
of increasing resource scarcity is in resource prices. Non-economists don’t always
agree with this view, but to economists, it’s hard to develop a model in which a
resourc that is about to be depleted has a price that is declining, especially a
resource owned by private individuals or governments. So in this section I will look
at what’s happened to resource prices during the last 50 years.
In discussing population and resource prices, it is useful to bring up Julian
Simon. Simon, who died in 1998, regularly attended the annual meetings of the
Population Association of America (PAA) when I started attending in the early
1980s. He was a gadfly, always taking provocative positions, and he had a
substantial impact on the population-resource debate. His 1981 book, The
Ultimate Resource, was filled with graphs of things like the price of coal and
copp r over time. The overall pattern was of falling prices, although with lots of
short-term volatility. The cover of the paperback, second edition of The Ultimate
Resource says “Every trend in material welfare has been improving—and promises
t do so, indefinitely” (Simon 1996). You can’t get much more optimistic than that.
Simon is certainly the poster child for optimism about the world’s ability to survive
the population bomb. The “ultimate resource” of the book’s title is human ingenuity,
which Simon argued is never in short supply and always generates solutions to the
pr ssures created by population growth.
The Ultimate Resource included predictions that were in many ways more
audacious than the predictions Ehrlich and Brown made about food shortages.
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Fig. 6 Food production in sub-Saharan Africa, 1961 to 2009. Data are from FAO (2011)
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Figure 3: Food production, globally and in sub-Saharan Africa, 1961–2009
Source: Lam (2011), based on data from FAO (2011)
of educati n—and importantly also levels of female schooling—have increased, global per
capita food production and consumption have risen, and the proportion of the global pop-
ulation living in poverty has declined significantly (Lam 2011) (Figure 3).
Lam (2011) recently attributed this accomplishment of increasing well-being despite
rapid population growth—which was taken far-from-granted several decades ago—to the
mbi ed eff ct of six fact rs, three of which are eco omic, three demographic (Lam 2011):
(1) market responses, causing for instance farmers to grow more food in response to higher
food prices or causing individuals to substitute away from scarce resources whose prices
increase in response to population pressures; (2) innovation, where population growth in-
creases the incentives (and potentially also the abilities) to develop new technologies and
knowledge, such as those underlying t e green revolutio , th t us vailable resources
more efficiently; (3) globalization, havi g resulted in an increased econo ic integration of
countries through international flows of good and capitals that improved efficiency of both
producti n and distribution; (4) urbanization, in which cities have absorbed a significant
proportion of the population growth in recent decades, thereby contributing to innova-
tions, economic growth and improvements in efficiency that helped to achieve increases
in living standards despite growing populations;4 (5) fertility decline, causing birth rates
with some lag to follow declining mortality rates and reducing rates of population growth
(Figure 1); (6) investments in children and child quality, resulting in large increases school
enrollment and human capital (for males, and even more so, for females), despite rapidly
growing cohort sizes, that contributed to reduced fertility, improved own and child health,
increased productivities and economic growth.
Chances are, the recent decades will remain a unique period in global demographic
history: after attaining a doubling of the world population most recently in only 39 years
from 3 to 6 billions, the global population is unlikely to double again. In the UN medium
projection, the global population will level off at around 10.1 billions in 2100, and even in
the high fertility scenario, the global population will remain below 16 billions. Estimates
of the earth’s carrying capacity are of little help in assessing if this growth is sustainable
and/or compatible with maintaining or even improving living standards (Cohen 1995a,b).
And while adding another 3 billion persons to the global population without undermin-
ing past progress in global living standards or measures of well being—or perhaps even
4Some scholars argue that urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa is occurring significantly slower as often be-
lieved. For example, according to Potts (2012a,b), very few countries in SSA have been experiencing rapid urban-
ization, in part because both urban and rural populations are growing rapidly. According to Pott’s analyses, many
countries in SSA are urbanizing very slowly, and some have even de-urbanized.
Hans-Peter Kohler
Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012
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Figure 4: Countries according to fertility level 2005–10
Note: Low fertility countries: net reproduction rate (NRR measured in daughters born per woman) less than 1;
intermediate fertility countries: NRR between 1 and 1.5; high fertility countries: NRR above 1.5
Source: Global Aganda Council on Population Growth (2012), based on UN Population Division (2010c)
improving upon them—will remain a challenging task, the tone of the population debate
and the perceived urgency of “the population problem” has dramatically changed in recent
years. The Economist for example feature major articles with titles such as “Go forth and
multiply a lot less: Lower fertility is changing the world for the better” (The Economist 2009)
and “The world’s population will reach 7 billion at the end of October [2011]. Don’t panic” (The
Economist 2011a), and while continued challenges of accommodating population growth
remain, the most recent press coverage of 7th billion persons living on earth (e.g., National
Geographic Magazine 2011; Osotimehin 2011; Roberts 2011; The Economist 2011a,b,c) has
been a lot less alarmist than in earlier discussions that echoed the fears expressed in books
like “The Population Bomb” (for a analyses of earlier population discussion of the population
problem, see Wilmoth and Ball 1992). A possible reason for this shift in perceptions of the
population problem is that, in many developing countries, as a result of substantial fertility
declines any future population growth is much more driven by population momentum—
i.e., expected increases in the number of individuals at primary reproductive ages in the
next decades that result from young age distributions and high previous rates of popula-
tion growth—rather than high current or future levels of fertility for which family planning
programs might provide one possibly policy intervention.
And yet, despite the undoubted successes of global mortality and fertility declines, and
the resulting recent declines in the rate of global population growth, the demographic tran-
sition remains an unfinished success story. High fertility and rapid population growth
remain important concerns in many least developed countries that may be most vulner-
able to the consequences of population growth (Figure 4). For example, because fertility
declines in SSA during recent years were less rapid than previously expected earlier (Bon-
gaarts 2008; Ezeh et al. 2009; Garenne 2011), the UN unexpectedly revised its 2010 forecast
for the world population upward to 10 billions, as compared to earlier forecasts predicting
a leveling off at 9 billions (UN Population Division 2010c). A recent report prepared for
the 2012 World Economic Forum (Global Aganda Council on Population Growth 2012),
for example, identifies 58 high fertility countries, defined as countries with net reproduc-
Hans-Peter Kohler
Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012
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Percentage illiterate among Level of contraceptive
women aged 15–24 use
14 Seven Billion and Growing: A 21st Century Perspective on Population
 The use of contraception, particularly of modern methods of 
contraception, is the usual means by which couples and individuals 
exercise control over the number of children they have. Since the 
introduction of modern contraceptives in the 1960s, their use among 
people who are married or living in a consensual union has increased 
markedly, particularly in populations where fertility has declined. 
Contraceptive prevalence, measured as the share of women aged 
15-49 who are married or in a union and who use some method of 
contraception, averaged 72% in developed countries and 61% in 
developing countries in 2009 and, among contraceptive users, those 
relying on modern methods constituted 85% of users in developed 
countries39 and 90% in developing countries.40
Contraceptive prevalence tends to be higher in low-fertility countries and 
in intermediate-fertility countries than in high-fertility countries (figure 13). 
Although most high-fertility countries still have very low contraceptive 
prevalence, in 15 of them contraceptive prevalence has surpassed 30% 
and in four it is above 50%. In general, lower contraceptive prevalence is 
associated with higher fertility but, as figure 13 shows, for a given level of 
total fertility, there is considerable variation in the level of contraceptive 
prevalence. This variation implies that factors other than overall 
contraceptive prevalence are important in determining fertility levels, 
including the effectiveness of the methods used, the incidence of 
childbearing outside marriage or consensual unions, and the incidence 
of abortion.
Figure 13 : Most recent level of contraceptive use vs total fertility in 
2005-2010
Source: United Nations, World Contraceptive Use 2011. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.11.
XIII.2, 2011.
The extent to which women rely on modern contraceptive methods 
varies between fertility groups. In 11 out of the 52 high-fertility countries 
with data, over 40% of contraceptive users rely on traditional methods of 
contraception, which are less effective than modern methods. In 
addition, in almost all countries with data on the method mix prevalent 
among contraceptive users, there is concentration of use in one or two 
methods. Such concentration suggests that accessibility to the widest 
possible range of safe and effective contraceptive methods is not yet a 
reality in many countries.
Despite the progress achieved by many countries in expanding access 
to modern contraceptives, wide disparities persist within countries, with 
the younger, poorer, less educated and rural segments of the population 
facing greater barriers to accessing effective methods of family planning. 
Major disparities in contraceptive use exist both across and within 
countries.41
As this report has shown, the future size and growth of the world 
population depends to a large extent on the future path fertility takes. 
Average world fertility has fallen from 4.9 children per woman in the late 
1960s to 2.5 children per woman today. This decline has largely been 
driven by the rapid reductions of fertility achieved by a majority of 
developing countries since the late 1960s. There is considerable 
experience on strategies that developing country governments and the 
international community can adopt to promote the voluntary reduction of 
fertility among their populations.
Actions by Countries
Government policies can affect fertility levels either directly or indirectly. 
Direct policies focus mainly on the proximate determinants of fertility by, 
for instance, setting lower limits for the age at which people can marry or 
by promoting and supporting access to contraception. Indirect policies 
are those that, although not aimed at influencing fertility, nevertheless 
change the incentive structure influencing parental desires regarding the 
number of children to have. Such policies include the provision of old-age 
pensions, incentives for women to join the labour force, and policies that 
reward higher educational attainment with better economic prospects, 
providing parents an incentive to invest more per child.38 In addition, 
policies adopted to increase human well-being and build human capital 
have influenced parents’ ability to reach their desired family size, including 
those directed at reducing child mortality and the efforts made to increase 
educational attainment, particularly among girls.
Improving the educational level of women is generally considered to be an 
important strategy to lower fertility. In developing countries, women who 
have completed secondary education have fewer children on average 
than women with little or no education. The ability to read and write is a 
major source of empowerment for women that translates into greater 
efficacy in making decisions for themselves and the ability to follow 
through with them. Yet, levels of illiteracy among women remain high in 
many developing countries, particularly among those with high fertility (in 
many countries, over 40% of women aged 15 to 24 were illiterate in 2008). 
Thus, high-fertility countries tend to have higher levels of illiteracy among 
women aged 15 to 24 than countries having intermediate fertility.
While the correlation between lowering fertility and increasing educational 
attainment is positive and strong (figure 12), education is only one 
instrument in lowering fertility. Indeed, several high-fertility countries have 
already achieved very low levels of illiteracy. Other policies, such as those 
described in the following paragraphs, are also needed.
Figure 12 : Percentage illiterate among women aged 15 to 24 years vs 
total fertility, 2008
Sources: Percentage illiterate was obtained from the Millennium Development Goals Indicators 
database available at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx. The total fertility was derived from 
the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm
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 The use of contraception, particularly of modern methods of 
contraception, is the usual means by which couples and individuals 
exercise control over the number of children they have. Since the 
introduction of modern contraceptives in the 1960s, their use among 
people who are married or living in a consensual union has increased 
markedly, particularly in populations where fertility has declined. 
Contraceptive prevalence, measured as the share of women aged 
15-49 who are married or in a union and who use some method of 
contraception, averaged 72% in developed countries and 61% in 
developing countries in 2009 and, among contraceptive users, those 
relying on modern methods constituted 85% of users in developed 
countries39 and 90% in developing countries.40
Contraceptive prevalence tends to be higher in low-fertility countries and 
in intermediate-fertility countries than in high-fertility countries (figure 13). 
Although most high-fertility countries still have very low contraceptive 
prevalence, in 15 of them contraceptive prevalence has surpassed 30% 
and in four it is above 50%. In general, lower contraceptive prevalence is 
associated with higher fertility but, as figure 13 shows, for a given level of 
total fertility, there is considerable variation in the level of contraceptive 
prevalence. This variation implies that factors other than overall 
contraceptive prevalence are important in determining fertility levels, 
including the effectiveness of the methods used, the incidence of 
childbearing outside marriage or consensual unions, and the incidence 
of abortion.
Figure 13 : Most recent level of contraceptive use vs total fertility in 
2005-2010
Source: United Nations, World Contraceptive Use 2011. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.11.
XIII.2, 2011.
The extent to which women rely on modern contraceptive methods 
varies between fertility groups. In 11 out of the 52 high-fertility countries 
with data, over 40% of contraceptive users rely on traditional methods of 
contraception, which are less effective than modern methods. In 
addition, in almost all countries with data on the method mix prevalent 
among contraceptive users, there is concentration of use in one or two 
methods. Such concentration suggests that accessibility to the widest 
possible range of safe and effective contraceptive methods is not yet a 
reality in many countries.
Despite the progress achieved by many countries in expanding access 
to modern contraceptives, wide disparities persist within countries, with 
the younger, poorer, less educated and rural segments of the population 
facing greater barriers to accessing effective methods of family planning. 
Major disparities in contraceptive use exist both across and within 
countries.41
As this r port has shown, the future size and growth of the world 
popul tion depends to a l rge extent on the fut re path fertility take . 
Average w rld fertility has fallen f om 4.9 children per woman in the late 
1960s to 2.5 children per woman today. This decline has larg ly been
driven by the rapid reductions of fertility achieved by a major ty of 
developing countries s ce the late 1960s. There is considerable
experience on st ategies that developing country g vern ts an  the 
international co munity ca dopt to promote th  v luntary reduction of 
fertili y among their populations.
Actions by Countries
Government policies can affect fertility levels either directly or indirectly. 
Direct policies focus mainly on the proximate determinants of fertility by, 
for instance, setting lower limits for the age at which people can marry or 
by promoting and supporting access to contraception. Indirect policies 
are those that, although not aimed at influencing fertility, nevertheless 
change the incentive structure influencing parental desires regarding the 
number of children to have. Such policies include the provision of old-age 
pensions, incentives for women to join the labour force, and policies that 
reward higher educational attainment with better economic prospects, 
providing parents an incentive to invest more per child.38 In addition, 
policies adopted to increase human well-being and build human capital 
have influenced parents’ ability to reach their desired family size, including 
those directed at reducing child mortality and the efforts made to increase 
educational attainment, particularly among girls.
Improving the educational level of women is generally considered to be an 
important strategy to lower fertility. In developing countries, women who 
have completed secondary education have fewer children on average 
than women with little or no education. The ability to read and write is a 
major source of empowerment for women that translates into greater 
efficacy in making decisions for themselves and the ability to follow 
through with them. Yet, levels of illiteracy among women remain high in 
many developing countries, particularly among those with high fertility (in 
many countries, over 40% of women aged 15 to 24 were illiterate in 2008). 
Thus, high-fertility countries tend to have higher levels of illiteracy among 
women aged 15 to 24 than countries having intermediate fertility.
While the correlation between lowering fertility and increasing educational 
attainment is positive and strong (figure 12), education is only one 
instrument in lowering fertility. Indeed, several high-fertility countries have 
already achieved very low levels of illiteracy. Other policies, such as those 
described in the following paragraphs, are also needed.
Figure 12 : Percentage illiterate among women aged 15 to 24 years vs 
total fertility, 2008
Sources: Percentage illiterate was obtained from the Millennium Development Goals Indicators 
database available at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx. The total fertility was derived from 
the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm
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Figure 5: Percentage ill terate mong women age 15–24 a d m st re ent level of contra-
ceptive use, by TFR levels
Source: Global Aganda Council on Population Growth (2012), based on UN Population Division (2011), UN Statis-
tics Division (2011) and UN Population Division (2010c)
tion rates (NRR) of more than 1.5 (Figure 4) that have intrinsic population growth rates
of 1.4% or higher.5 The high fertility countries are concentrated in Africa, where 39 out
of the 55 countries on the continent have high fertility, but also exist in Asia (9 countries),
Oceania (6 countries) and Latin America (4 countries). Almost two third of these high fer-
tility countries are classified by the United Nations as least developed, and 38 out of the
total of 48 countries that are classified as least developed have high fertility. Most high
fertility countries have current population growth rates of 2.5 percent or higher, which, if
maintained, would imply a doubling of the population every 35 years. Female education
levels (as indicated by illiteracy) and contraceptive use tend to be relatively low in the high
fertility countries (Figure 5). Despite having currently only about 18% of the world popu-
lation, high fertility countries account today for about 38% of the 78 million persons that
are added annually to the world population. Based on UN median population projections,
the TFR in high fertility countries is projected to decline to 2.8 by 2050, and 2.1 by 2100.
Despite these projected TFR declines, the current high fertility countries will make the
largest contribution to the annual increment of the world population after 2018, and after
2060, world population is projected to grow exclusively as a result of population growth
in the current high fertility countries (Figure 6). During the 21st century, therefore, the
current high fertility countries will be the major contributors to continued world popula-
tion growth. Past and continued progress in reducing mortality, combined with sustained
above-replacement fertility levels that does not drop to a TFR of 2.1 until 2100 in the UN
median projection, will be a primary cause of this rapid population growth, in addition to a
population momentum that results from the very young age structures in these countries.
The analyses in this paper will primarily focus on high fertility countries in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) because this region has the highest concentration of high fertility countries
that make the dominant contribution to the world population growth resulting from high
fertility countries (Figure 4), and because SSA high fertility countries belong to the poorest
and most vulnerable countries in the world with often weak institutions and capacities to
manage population growth. Figure 7 shows the observed and projected (based on UN sce-
5A net reproduction rates (NRR) of more than 1.5 means that more than 1.5 daughters are born to women given
2010 fertility and mortality levels. This implies that the next generation is 50% larger than the current generation,
and at constant fertility and mortality levels, a NRR of 1.5 implies a long-term annual population growth rate
of about 1.4%. Intrinsic growth rate is the population growth rate that would prevail in the long term if current
patterns of fertility and mortality were to prevail in a population and the population is closed to migration.
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Figure 6 Estimated and projected fertility for the group of high-fertility 
countries according to different projection variants, 1950-2100
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm
Figure 7 A comparison of projected annual population increments for the 
high-fertility and the intermediate-fertility countries according to different 
projection variants, 1950-2100 (millions) 
High-fertility countries
Intermediate-fertility countries
 
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm
The potential growth of the population of high-fertility countries is 
therefore a key issue. According to the medium variant, if the average 
fertility of high-fertility countries drops from the 4.9 children per woman 
in 2005-2010 to 2.8 children per woman in mid-century and further to 
2.1 children per woman by the century’s end (figure 6), their contribution 
to annual population growth will peak around the middle of this century 
at 39 million and will then begin a slow decline. This path can be 
achieved because the reduction of fertility in the high-fertility countries 
projected over the next 40 years is similar to that achieved by today’s 
intermediate-fertility countries over just three decades: between the 
early 1970s and the early 2000s, their total fertility declined from 4.9 to 
2.7 children per woman. However, if fertility in the high-fertility countries 
declines more slowly by, for instance, reaching only 3.3 children per 
woman by mid-century instead of 2.8, and 2.6 children per woman by 
the end of the century instead of 2.1, their annual contribution to world 
population growth will continue to rise, passing from 28 million in 2011 to 
67 million in 2099. Clearly, small differences in future fertility, if sustained, 
can lead to major differences in future population growth.
Since the population of low-fertility countries is expected to start 
declining around 2030 according to the medium variant, world 
population growth over a longer-term horizon will depend on the 
contributions made by the intermediate-fertility and the high-fertility 
countries (figure 6). Another way of assessing the potential for future 
population growth in those two groups of countries is to consider the 
results of a “no-change” scenario that maintains fertility and mortality 
constant in each country at current levels (figure 7). According to that 
scenario, the annual contribution of the high-fertility countries to 
population growth would increase 10 times from now to the end of the 
century: from 28 million in 2011 to 284 million in 2099. In sharp contrast, 
the no-change scenario for the intermediate-fertility countries, whose 
population size today is more than twice that of the high-fertility 
countries, produces annual increments that vary over a narrow range, 
peaking at 38 million in 2014, declining to 24 million around 2065 and 
then increasing slowly to reach 30 million by 2099. These comparisons 
further confirm that the high-fertility countries of today have the highest 
potential to add large numbers of people to the world population and 
imply that the future size of the world population is highly dependent on 
future changes in their fertility levels.
Figure 5 Annual increments of the population in high-fertility countries, 
intermediate-fertility countries and low-fertility countries according to the 
medium projection variant, 1950-2100 (millions)
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm
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Figure 6: Annual increments of the populatio in high-fertility countries, intermediate-
fertility countries and low-fertility countries according to the medium projection vari-
ant, 1950-2100 (millions)
Source: Global Aganda Council on Population Growth (2012), based on UN Population Division (2010c)
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Figure 7: Population size, population growth rate, life expectancy at birth and total fer-
tility rate for Sub-Saharan Africa, 1950–2060
Note: Based on UN median, high and low projections (UN Population Division 2010c). Bold line: median projec-
tion. Broken lines: low/high projections. Projected life expectancy is identical across the UN medium, low and
high projections.
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Table 1: Population size, total fertility rate (TFR), life expectancy and population growth
rate in the 10 most populous SSA countries
Source: Based on UN median projections (UN Population Division 2010c)
Population TFR Life Expectancy Growth Rate
(millions) at birth (in percent)
1980 2010 1980--85 2005--10 1980--85 2005--10 1980--85 2005--10
Nigeria 75.5 158.4 6.8 5.6 45.8 50.3 2.55 2.50
Ethiopia 35.4 82.9 6.9 4.6 43.5 57.2 2.96 2.21
DR Congo 27.0 66.0 6.7 6.1 46.2 47.4 2.78 2.78
South Africa 29.1 50.1 4.6 2.6 58.4 51.2 2.52 0.96
Tanzania 18.7 44.8 6.6 5.6 50.8 55.4 3.13 2.88
Sudan 20.1 43.6 6.3 4.6 50.2 60.3 3.19 2.51
Kenya 16.3 40.5 7.2 4.8 58.9 55.0 3.78 2.58
Uganda 12.7 33.4 7.1 6.4 49.9 52.2 3.12 3.24
Ghana 10.9 24.4 6.3 4.3 53.8 62.7 3.28 2.39
Mozambique 12.1 23.4 6.4 5.1 42.8 48.8 1.87 2.38
narios) population size, population growth rate, life expectancy at birth and total fertility
rate for the period 1950–2060. The overall SSA population growth rate has peaked in the
early 1980s and has been declining from its peak of 2.8% in 1980–85 to 2.5% in 2005-10. It
is 110% higher than the global population growth rate, resulting in both a projected rapid
growth of the population as well as an increasing share of the global population that is
in SSA. While mortality has declined, and life expectancy has increased significantly in
SSA, the progress has lagged behind other developing countries, in part but not only, due
to the HIV/AIDS epidemic (Magadi and Agwanda 2010). For example, the 2005–10 life
expectancy of 52.5 years is 20% below the average life expectancy in less developed coun-
tries; infant mortality in SSA is 85 per 1,000, 68% higher than the infant mortality rate in all
less developed countries, and the maternal mortality of 640 per 100,000 live births (2008)
exceeds that of all less developed countries by 120% (UN Millennium Development Goals
2011; UN Population Division 2010c). And while fertility has declined from its peak of 6.71
in 1970–75, the 2005–10 TFR levels for SSA of 5.1 exceed that of all less developed countries
by 90%. And because more than 42% of the SSA population is below age 15 in 2010, there
is considerable population momentum even if fertility were to decline relatively rapidly.
It is important to emphasize that these averages mask considerable heterogeneity in
both fertility and mortality (Table 1), with TFR among the 10 most populous SSA countries
ranging from 2.6 to 6.1, and life expectancy ranging from 48.8 to 62.7. On the one hand,
several of these largest SSA countries have experienced substantial declines in fertility. But,
on the other hands, these sustained declines in fertility are far from universal in SSA, and
many SSA countries continue to have high fertility and rapid population growth rates. The
potential implications of this are also increasingly recognized by political leaders. While in
1976 just 38 per cent of the governments of countries in Africa viewed fertility as too high,
75 per cent of them did so by 2009; 68% considered the rate of growth of the population as
too high as compared to 35% in 1976 (UN Population Division 2010a).
To illustrate the rapid projected population growth in some SSA countries, Table 2 lists
nine countries whose population is expected to triple between 2010 and 2060 base on the
UN medium population projections along with their 2010 and 2060 population size and
projected growth rates. The population growth rate in these countries is the next five
decades ranges from 2.2–3.0 percent, is therefore expected to be 14–55% higher than the
projected SSA average. The relatively high fertility underlying this projected rapid pop-
ulation growth is often attributed to the fact that many high-fertility SSA countries have
a considerable—and possibly growing—“unmet need” for family planning, where unmet
Hans-Peter Kohler
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Table 2: SSA countries that are projected to triple their population size during 2010–60
Source: Based on UN median projections (UN Population Division 2010c)
Population Size Ratio Projected
(in millions) 2060 to 2010 population growth
2010 2060 population rate 2010-60
Niger 15.5 70.9 4.57 3.04
Zambia 13.1 59.2 4.52 3.02
Malawi 14.9 63.3 4.25 2.89
Somalia 9.3 36.0 3.85 2.70
Tanzania 44.8 172.2 3.84 2.69
16.5 56.8 3.45 2.48
Uganda 33.4 112.6 3.37 2.43
Mali 15.4 50.5 3.29 2.38
Madagascar 20.7 63.2 3.05 2.23
SSA 856.3 2277.3 2.66 1.96
Burkina Faso
need is a concept used by demographers to measure the number of women who are fe-
cund and sexually active, but are not using any method of contraception despite the fact
that they report not wanting any more children or wanting to delay the next child (Cast-
erline and Sinding 2000; UN Statistics Division 2011). The concept of unmet need thus
points to a potential gap between women’s reproductive intentions and their contraceptive
behavior.6 In high fertility SSA countries, several studies indicate that a sizable fraction—
around 25%—of sexually active fecund women who would like to limit their fertility do
not use family planning methods and thus have unmet need for family planning (Darroch
and Singh 2011; Prata 2009; UN Population Division 2009). Moreover, given the relatively
low rates of contraceptive prevalence and weak institutional support of family planning
programs, and the significant changes necessary to achieve the fertility decline in the UN
median scenario, some scholars consider the UN median scenario as too optimistic in terms
of the assumed pace of future fertility decline (Cleland et al. 2011; Eastwood and Lipton
2011) because contraceptive use is unlikely to increase sufficiently fast to achieve these pro-
jected TFR declines. Moreover, while global food production has more than kept up with
population growth since the 1960 (Figure 3), sub-Saharan Africa exhibits signs of strain.
While feed production increased during 1960–2009 by a factor of 3.4—more than for the
world as a whole—the population grew even faster (by a factor of 3.6) in that time period,
causing per capita food consumption to decline by about 7% since 1961 (Lam 2011).7
In light of the above trends, a new literature is emerging that emphasizes the “return
of population growth factor” (Campbell et al. 2007), the “unfinished agenda” of family plan-
ning programs (Cleland et al. 2006) or the “stalls in fertility declines” (Bongaarts 2006, 2008;
6Unmet need has been incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) monitoring, where un-
met need is expressed as a percentage of women married and in union aged 15 to 49 (UN Statistics Division 2011,
Millennium Development Goals Indicators metadata). Critics of the concept of unmet need point out that this
concept implies either a very broad or a very paternalistic notion of “need” (Pritchett 1994) because it includes not
only women who want to use contraception and don’t do so because of supply-side restrictions, but also iden-
tifies women as “needing” if they require additional motivation before they want to use family planning or are
constrained by other than supply-side factors in their contraceptive decision-making; there are hence concerns
that unmet need potentially overstates the potential effect of improved contraceptive provision, which modern
family planning programs try to address by including also other reproductive health services, behavioral change
communication and interpersonal communication through health workers and community leaders; see Section
3.4. For a comprehensive discussion of unmet need and its use in discussions of family planning and population
policies, see Casterline and Sinding (2000).
7Lam (2011) also points out that the more recent trend is somewhat more encouraging, given that food produc-
tion has grown faster than population since about 1995, although not fast enough to completely offset the earlier
declines in per capita food production.
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Ezeh et al. 2009) in SSA. Some analyses have speculated about a “gift of dying” in which the
HIV/AIDS epidemic enhances the future per capita consumption possibilities of the South
African economy by reducing fertility, thereby more than compensating for the loss of hu-
man capital (Young 2005). Yet, it is far from clear if such a negative effect of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic on fertility exists (Fortson 2009; Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan 2011), in which case
Young’s (2005) argument unravels. And yet, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is not central to
the renewed concerns about population growth in SSA since it’s effect—especially given
also the recent expansion of antiretroviral treatment (ART)—on overall population growth
trends is relatively modest (UN Population Division 2010b). Focusing on fertility, therefore,
a recent Lancet article Cleland et al. (2006) asked “Can disaster be prevented in Niger?”, given
Niger’s unchanged TFR levels that are among the highest in the world, and “[Is the] Kenyan
success in jeopardy”, given a stalling of the fertility decline in the last decade that has caused
the UN to revise its median 2050 population projection for Kenya from 44 millions (2002
World Population Prospects) to 96.9 millions (2010 World Population Prospects). Potts
et al. (2011) write in an article entitled “Niger: Too little, too late” that “the failure to empha-
size family planning since 1994 has transformed a serious demographic scenario into a potentially
catastrophic one”. Campbell (2007) described the silence around population growth as the
“perfect storm” that may undermine broader development efforts. Just before the Copen-
hagen Consensus 2012 conference, a theme on population growth in sub-Saharan Africa
in the New York Times included a slide show entitled “In Nigeria, a Preview of an Over-
crowded Planet” and raised concerns about whether patterns of fertility decline, which have
occurred elsewhere in the world and curtailed population growth, will similarly “defuse
the population bomb in sub-Saharan Africa [...] where the population rise far outstrips economic
expansion” (Rosenthal 2012a,b).
Continued high fertility, such as in Niger or Nigeria, or stalls in fertility declines dur-
ing the last decade, such as in Kenya, are often attributed to a reduced pace (or lack of)
economic development, continued high levels of desired fertility, relatively low levels of
contraceptive use (possibly as a result of reduced and/or inadequate resources devoted to
family planning programs), and relatively high levels of mortality (in part, but not only,
as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic) (Bongaarts 2006, 2008, 2011; Cleland et al. 2011;
Ezeh et al. 2009). Many of these analyses call for a renewed emphasis on family planning
programs. However, to highlight the potentially broad benefits of reduced fertility and
population growth, the contemporary literature arguing for a renewed interest in family
planning programs does not view population growth a “problem” in itself, but portraits it
as a major threat towards attaining social and economic development, such as for instance
reflected in the Millennium Development Goals (APPG 2007; Cates et al. 2010; Cleland
et al. 2006). Specifically, potential adverse effects that are often attributed to rapid popula-
tion growth include poor health among women and children, slow economic growth and
poverty, overcrowded schools and clinics and an overburdened infrastructure, as well as
the depletion of environmental resources (Birdsall et al. 2001). There are also arguments
that rapid population growth contributes to high unemployment and inequality among
rapidly growing young populations may contribute to the spread of political violence and
civil strife (Cincotta et al. 2003; Goldstone et al. 2012). A recent UK parliamentary report for
example cites the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed
Countries as “The battle against endemic poverty and chronic hunger, particularly in the world’s
50 Least Developed Countries, is made all the more difficult due to their current high rates of pop-
ulation growth” and concludes that “the [Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)] are difficult
or impossible to achieve with current levels of population growth in the least developed countries”
(APPG 2007). Melinda Gates argued at the 2012 TED Summit “Let’s put birth control back on
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the agenda” (Gates 2012b), based on the premise that many of the world’s pressing social
change issues depend on ensuring that women are able to control their rate of having kids.
In similar vein, Campbell et al. (2007) writes in a recent Science Policy Forum: “Decisions
made now can influence the growth rate [through lowering fertility]. If the rates are not altered,
hundreds of millions of families will suffer from poverty, hunger, inadequate education, and lack of
employment opportunities, all of which might otherwise have been avoided.”
And yet, despite the rapid population growth and the renewed concerns about social
and economic development that are associated with it, resources devoted to family plan-
ning have waned. And while several major foundations—including the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation and the Hewlett Foundation—have implemented major programs in the
area of family planning and are drawing attention to family planning and related needs
to invest in reproductive health in developing countries (Gates 2012a; Hewlett Founda-
tion 2012), overall global resources spent on family planning have declined. For example,
while funds committed by donors and developing countries to HIV and AIDS increased
by nearly 300%, funds devoted to family planning declined by some 30% (Bongaarts 2008).
In particular, donor funding for family planning peaked in 2002 at US$ 700 million and has
since declined to about US$ 400 million (UNFPA 2010). Given the increase in the number
of women of reproductive age, donor funding for family planning per capita has declined
by more than 50% since 1995 in virtually all recipient countries. This relative neglect of
family-planning programs is related to arguably due to premature claims of an end to the
“population explosion,” shifting attention from population growth to the AIDS epidemic and
a consequent reallocation of resources, and growing conservative religious and political op-
position (Bongaarts and Sinding 2011a). These cuts in donor funding are likely to have also
contributed to a reduced commitment of developing country governments to family plan-
ning programs and a reduced availability of family planning services today as compared
to a decade ago (Bongaarts and Sinding 2009). Evaluating progress—or lack thereof—in
family planning efforts during the recent years, the above-cited UK parliamentary report
write that the “The Dream of Cairo” (referring to the 1994 United Nations International Con-
ference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo) has failed and that the time since
has been a “Lost Decade” for the focus on population and family planning (APPG 2007).
In light of this mismatch between declining funding of family planning programs and
reduced international focus on issues related to population growth on the one hand, and
the prospect of substantial population growth of some of the world’s poorest and most
vulnerable populations on the other hand, several scholars have called for a renewed in-
vestment in family planning programs, and a reinstatement of these programs as a priority
in high fertility countries, to not only reduce population growth, but also facilitate the
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (APPG 2007; Cates et al. 2010; Cle-
land et al. 2006, 2012). Consistent with this new emphasis on family planning as part of
a broader development agenda, the World Bank (2010) has issued a “Reproductive Health
Action Plan that emphasizes reproductive health as a “key facet of human development” and
argues that this renewed emphasis on reproductive health offers “an unprecedented oppor-
tunity to redress the neglect of the previous decade”. And while the tide of the debate might
be shifting in the direction of renewed interest in family planning programs, important
skepticism about these programs remains. These critical perspectives on the effectiveness
of family planning programs potentially have contributed to the waning support—both
financial and otherwise—of these programs. Critics and skeptics, for example, often claim
that (Bongaarts and Sinding 2009): family planning programs have little or no effect on
fertility levels or the pace of fertility decline (Connelly 2008; Pritchett 1994); these pro-
grams are no longer necessary since fertility declines are under way globally and will
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continue to even in the absence of such programs (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Eber-
stadt 2006); family planning programs are not cost effective (Pritchett 1994); the linkage
between reduced fertility and slower population growth and economic development is
weak (National Research Council 1986); the reversal of mortality declines as a result of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic have made family planning and reduced fertility less important and
desirable (Mosher 2000); and that family planning programs have made women the in-
struments of population control policies, and at worst, have been coercive (Campbell and
Bedford 2009; Mosher 2008).
The proponents of family planning programs emphasize that many of these criticisms
of family planning programs are mistaken (e.g. Bongaarts and Sinding 2009). Moreover,
and potentially more importantly, recent research on the interactions between popula-
tion growth and economic developments (Bloom and Canning 2004; Bloom et al. 2007b,
2002, 1998) and careful evaluations of past family planning programs (Joshi 2011; Joshi and
Schultz 2007; Mills et al. 2011; Schultz 2009) have strengthened the case that family plan-
ning programs are a good “investment” (Bongaarts and Sinding 2011b) that not only help to
reduce fertility but also facilitate the attainment of a broad set of development goals such
as reduced infant and maternal mortality, increases in schooling and gender equality, and
reductions in poverty (Global Aganda Council on Population Growth 2012). But is this
renewed emphasis on population growth and family planning justified given our knowl-
edge about the effects of family planning programs and the current knowledge about the
interrelations between population growth and economic development? This assessment
paper Copenhagen Consensus 2012 project therefore revisits the current literature on pop-
ulation growth, the demographic transition and family planning programs, and provides
benefit-cost ratios for investments in family planning programs.
3. THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
Demographic transitions, including those still in process in the developing world, are fre-
quently perceived as resulting from the economic and technological changes of the mod-
ern era that have led to economic development, mass communication, effective programs
of public health, availability of contraceptive methods and related social changes. Before
the start of the demographic transition, lives were short (around 30 years), survival at all
stages of the life course was relatively uncertain, fertility rates were high (with TFRs around
5–7 children per woman), population growth was slow, and populations were relatively
young (Figure 8). During the demographic transition, initially mortality and then fertil-
ity declines, resulting initially in an increase and then a decline in the population growth
rate (Figure 8). In addition, the age structure of the population is transformed. Initially, the
population growths “younger” as a result of a rapid increase of births and a decline of infant
mortality; then, the population grows “older” as a result of smaller birth cohorts, increased
longevity, and the aging of the earlier large cohorts. Towards the end of the demographic
transition, population growth declines (and potentially ceases or becomes negative), fertil-
ity is low, life expectancy is high, with mortality risks being low to very low at young and
adult ages and deaths concentrated at older ages, and the population age structure being
relatively old (Lee 2003, 2011). In addition to population size and age structure, family
structures, life courses, social and economic contexts are fundamentally transformed (Lee
and Reher 2011), with important implications for social and economic development that
may further facilitate the demographic transition (Figure 9)
The social context of fertility decisions in pre-transitional populations has varied tremen-
dously over time and space. It changed with trends in culture, religious and political influ-
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The starting points of these demographic paths differ somewhat. India had
higher initial fertility and mortality than Europe, as did the Least Developed
Countries relative to the Less Developed Countries in 1950, which in turn had far
higher mortality and fertility than the More Developed Countries in that year.
Except for India, the starting points all indicate moderate (for Europe) to rapid
(for Least and Less Developed Countries) population growth. But in all cases, the
initial path is horizontally to the right—most strikingly for India—indicating that
mortality decline preceded fertility decline, causing accelerating population growth
Figure 3
Life Expectancy and Total Fertility Rate with Population Growth Isoquants: Past
and Projected Trajectories for More, Less and Least Developed Countries
Sources: Historical and Middle Series forecasts for Least, Less and More Developed Countries are
taken from the United Nations (2003). Data for India are taken from Bhat (1989) for the period
1891–1901 to 1941–1951, and from the United Nations (2003) for the period 1950–1970. Data for
Europe are based on Tables 6.2–6.5 in Livi-Bacci (2000) for the period 1800–1900 and Mitchell
(1975) for the period 1900–1950. For the period 1800–1900, European total fertility rate and e(0)
are derived as a population-weighted average of country-specific data. Where unavailable, these data
are estimated based on regression using the crude birth rate and death rates to predict total fertility
rate and e(0), respectively, for other European countries in this period. For the period 1900–1950, a
single series of crude birth rates and death rates for all Europe are assembled. A regression based on
data from 1900 to 1950 is used to predict total fertility rate and e(0) based on the crude birth rate
and death rate, respectively. The growth isoquants are derived from Coale and Demeny (1983) using
the Model West Female life table when the mean age of childbearing is 29.
Ronald Lee 177
Figure 8: Life Expectancy and Total Fertility Rate with Population Growth Isoquants:
Past and Projected Trajectories for Mor , Less and Least Devel ped Countries
Note: The horizontal axis of the figure shows life expectancy at birth. The vertical axis shows the total fertility rate.
The contours illustrate the steady-state population gr wth rate corresponding t constant fertility and mortality at
the indicated level, where the dark contour represents zero population growt and movement toward the upper
right corner indicates increasingly rapid growth. On this graph, the emographic transition will first appear
as a move to th right, r presenting a gain in life expectancy wit little change in fertility and a movement to
a higher population growth contour, then, as a di gonal downward movement toward the right reflecting the
simultaneous decline in fertility and m rtality, recrossing contours toward lower ra es of growth.
Source: Lee (2003)
ences; it was affected by technological progress, innovations or discoveries; and it evolved
through social and cultural adaptation. Despite these variations it is remarkable that pop-
ulation rowth r tes for most (surviving) societies w re relatively modest over much of
human history. Preceding t Neolithic Revolutio (approximately 10,000 BC) the average
long-run net rep oduction rate was near unity, to within a few ten- housandths. Between
the Neolithic Revolution and 1750 AD the world population grew f om 6 million to 771 mil-
lion, which implies a very moderate averag annual gr wth rate of 0.04%. Short-term fluc-
tuations around this trend are well documented. Yet, the low lo g-term growth rates, that
prevailed despite large variations in reproductive environments and mortality conditions,
strongly suggest the existence of an equilibrating mechanism between population size and
available resources: population homeostasis. This homeostatic theory was first devised by
Malthus (1798) on the strength of three basic economic relationships he identified in pre-
industrial England. On the one hand, when real wages fall below some subsistence level,
mortality increases and population growth is curtained through a positive check of prema-
ture mortality. On the other hand, when real wages increase, marriage is encouraged. In
addition, agricultural production faces diminishing returns to labor. Hence, increases in
population size tend to imply lower wages, which in turn will tend to reduce population
growth through positive checks (increased mortality) or preventive checks such as absti-
nence or delayed marriage. Demographic and economic evidence is largely consistent with
the homeostatic theory for England from about 1250 to 1700 (Lee 1973, 1980). During this
period, Wages were largely inversely related to population size. And despite the frequent
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Figure 9: Schematic framework for the demographic transition and associated social and
economic changes
Source: Reher (2011)
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association of Malthusianism with a population re-balancing that occurs through increased
mortality, even in preindustrial societies, the preventive check on population growth via
fertility occupied a central place, whereas the positive check operated relatively indepen-
dently of wage rates.
With the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in England these relationships unmis-
takably altered: population growth initially accelerated as a result of reduced mortality,
but wages nonetheless continued to increase. With some delay, fertility started to decline,
and so did population growth rates. The occurrence of rapid demographic change dur-
ing the process of socioeconomic modernization led to the formalization of the demographic
transition theory. The basic idea is that socioeconomic development first induces a mortal-
ity decline and, with some lag, a decrease in fertility. The easiest way to summarize this
theory is to quote from one of its formulators:
[Premodern birthrates in Europe] . . . were high by present standards. In-
deed, they had to be high [in face of the inevitably high mortality]. . . . Peasant
societies in Europe, and almost universally throughout the world, are orga-
nized in ways that bring strong pressures on their members to reproduce. The
economic organization of relatively self-sufficient agrarian communities turns
almost wholly about the family, and the perpetuation of the family is the main
guarantee of support and elemental security. . . . In such societies, moreover,
there is scant opportunity for women to achieve either economic support or
personal prestige outside the roles of wife and mother, and women’s economic
functions are organized in ways that are compatible with continuous childbear-
ing.
These arrangements, which stood the test of experience through-out the cen-
turies of high mortality, are strongly supported by popular beliefs, formalized
in religious doctrine, and enforced by community sanctions. They are deeply
woven into the social fabric and are slow to change. Mortality dropped rather
promptly in response to external changes because mankind had always cov-
eted health. The decline of fertility, however, awaited the gradual obsolescence
of age-old social and economic institutions and the emergence of a new ideal in
matters of family size.
The new ideal of the small family arose typically in the urban industrial
society. . . . Urban life stripped the family of many functions in production,
consumption, recreation, and education. In factory employment the individ-
ual stood on his own accomplishments. The new mobility of young people and
the anonymity of city life reduced the pressures toward traditional behavior ex-
erted by the family and community. . . . Education and a rational point of view
became increasingly important. As a consequence the cost of child-rearing grew
and the possibilities for economic contributions by children declined. Falling
death-rates at once increased the size of the family to be supported and lowered
the inducements to have many births. Women, moreover, found new indepen-
dence from household obligations and new economic roles less compatible with
childbearing. . . . Under these multiple pressures old ideals and beliefs began
to weaken, and the new ideal of a small number of children gained strength.
(Notestein 1953, pp. 16-17)
The corpus of this theory is very broad. It entails the central role of norms and their
erosion, the emergence of rational fertility decisions, and the changing socioeconomic en-
vironment. As a descriptive tool, the theory provides a framework to conceptualize de-
mographic change. The question is, how well the theory performs as a predictive tool that
allows the analysis of fertility behavior in a positive sense, and that establishes a firm link
between the causes and consequences of demographic change. Over the past few decades,
intensive research on demographic change in historical and contemporary societies has
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revealed complex patterns that do not fit neatly into the theoretical schema of the demo-
graphic transition, including for instance the stalled fertility transitions that have occurred
in parts of SSA (Bongaarts 2006, 2008; Ezeh et al. 2009; Garenne 2011). The transition theory
neglected the subtleties and variability of the process, and it became increasingly perceived
as being too narrow in terms of the causal mechanisms and factors that are the primary
drivers of mortality and fertility change. In particular, observing the fertility transitions
during the 20th century, it is clear that fertility has declined in combination with rapid
development, but it has also declined in resource poor countries (Vietnam, Bangladesh),
in countries with low levels of female education (e.g., Haiti, Cambodia), in countries with
low levels of female labor force participation (e.g., Egypt, Turkey) and in countries with
high levels of gender inequality (e.g., Iran). And yet, the majority of fertility transitions
in SSA are still in process, and in some areas a substantial decline in birth and population
growth rates is yet to occur (Figure 4). Whether the fertility transitions in SSA will fol-
low the pattern of earlier fertility transitions, for instance those in Latin America and Asia,
remains the topic of a controversial debate. And so does the question of whether family
planning programs, which may have contributed to the declines of fertility in other con-
texts, are effective—and possibly cost-effective—programs that can facilitate the decline of
fertility and, as a consequences of better fertility control, improvements in health and eco-
nomic development. To put the discussion of these issues into context, we first review in
the next sections the knowledge about the causes of the demographic transitions, its impli-
cations for economic development, and the role that family planning may have played in
facilitating fertility transitions.
3.1. Declines of Mortality
The decline in mortality is widely perceived to be a prerequisite of sustained fertility de-
cline (Mason 1997), and population growth during the demographic transition arises due
to lag between declining mortality and fertility rates (Figure 8). The decline of mortality
therefore deserves some discussion in this paper, even if it is not the primary focus of the
analyses here. In Europe, early declines in mortality during the 18th and 19th century were
importantly driven by improvements in nutrition, sanitation, housing and transportation
(Cutler et al. 2006; Lee 2003). Knowledge about the germ theory of disease were critical to
changing both public health infrastructure and personal behavior. Public health measures
played an important role starting in the late 19th century, and during the 20th century,
medical progress in vaccination and the treatment of infectious and chronic diseases made
important contributions to gains in life expectancy. The pace of gains in life expectancy has
been remarkably constant, and Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) show that in the 160 years since
1840, life expectancy in the world’s leading country in terms of longevity has increased by
three months per calendar year. Improvements in life expectancy in developing countries
occurred relatively rapidly compared to the historical gains in Europe. In India and China,
for example, life expectancies have risen by nearly 30 years since 1950 and, even in Africa,
where there has been much less economic progress, life expectancy rose by more than 13
years from the early 1950s to the late 1980s, before declining in the face of HIV/AIDS. Re-
niers et al. (2011) for instance finds that, declines in adult mortality in SSA during the last
few decades have been modest, and in some populations drastic mortality reversals have
been recorded. These reversals are primarily driven by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, but the
extremely high adult mortality rates in some southeastern African countries are due to the
triple burden of infectious and chronic diseases and the relatively high level of deaths due
to external injuries.
The rapid decline in mortality after the World War II in developing countries happened
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because knowledge and technologies based on 200 years worth of progress against mor-
tality in the now-rich countries could be used in improving mortality in the rest of the
world. Measures such as improvements in water supply, cleansing the environment of dis-
ease vectors (like anopheles mosquitoes that carry malaria or rats that carry lice), the use of
antibiotics and the widespread immunization of children—the combined development of
which had taken many years in the West—were introduced to the rest of the world over a
relatively very short span of time. Preston (1980), for example, attributed about half of the
gain in life expectancy in developing countries (excluding China) from the 1930s to the late
1960s to the combined effects of changes in income, literacy and the supply of calories, and
the remaining to the public health measures newly implemented in these countries. And
yet, there is a is a great deal more to be done before health in poor countries resembles that
in rich countries today (Cutler et al. 2006). For many leading causes of death and/or poor
health in the least developed countries, knowledge and technologies about suitable pre-
vention and/or treatments are—at least in principle—relatively inexpensively available.
These relatively easily preventable causes of death include for instance diarrheal disease
and respiratory infections, being respectively the first and fourth leading causes of death
worldwide, as well as malaria, tuberculosis and several infectious children’s diseases such
as whooping cough, tetanus, polio, diphtheria and measles. However, in many cases, these
available and relatively cheap and easy-to-administer treatments and/or preventive steps
continue to be used much less than seems desirable (and beneficial), and specifically in
SSA, infant, maternal and adult mortality continue to remain relatively high (Rajaratnam
et al. 2010; UN Millennium Development Goals 2011). Some related Copenhagen Consen-
sus Assessment Papers have addressed some of the benefits and challenges in improving
health and mortality through interventions (Behrman et al. 2004; Behrman and Kohler 2011;
Hoddinott et al. 2012; Horton et al. 2009; Jamison et al. 2012, 2009; Jha et al. 2012). Efforts
to improve health care systems and the utilization of existing technologies, knowledge and
medications are actively promoted in many SSA and other developing countries. In ad-
dition, and specifically relevant for SSA, the recent roll-out of antiretroviral treatment for
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2010, 2011) has started to curtail and possibly reverse the increases
in mortality that have occurred since the onset of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (Bongaarts et al.
2011; Herbst et al. 2009; Jahn et al. 2008). Reniers et al. (2011) finds that the onset of some
of these recent declines in adult mortality even preceded the large-scale availability of an-
tiretroviral therapy.
3.2. Why Fertility Declines
The fertility response to falling infant mortality was often remarkably fast (Mason 1997),
frequently within one generation. Exploiting exogenous variation in the ecology of malaria
transmission, McCord et al. (2010) for example estimate that in sub-Saharan Africa child
mortality is a powerfully robust driver of fertility behavior, and that meeting the Millen-
nium Development Goal of reducing 1990 child mortality rates by 66% in sub-Saharan
Africa would translate into a reduction of total fertility rates from around 6.3 in 1990 to
3.3, more than halfway towards achieving replacement fertility levels of 2.1. The decline
of mortality, which initiated the rapid growth of population during the demographic tran-
sition, therefore, also contributes to the end of population growth. And while mortality
decline is almost always a precondition for sustained fertility decline, the link between pat-
terns of mortality and fertility declines are not very tight (Guinnane 2011). For example,
one of the central challenges to the notion of fertility change as formulated in the demo-
graphic transition theory is due to Coale (1973, p. 65), who concluded, based on analyses
of fertility decline in Europe, that “[t]he diversity of circumstances under which marital fertility
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has declined, and the consequent difficulties of formulating a well-defined threshold, may originate
in the existence of more than one broad precondition for a decline”. Coale thus identified three
preconditions for a major fall in marital fertility: (i) fertility must be within the calculus
of conscious choice; (ii) reduced fertility must be advantageous; (iii) effective techniques
of fertility control must be available. These conditions are not so much a predictive tool
as an integrative device for discussing the approaches of different behavioral schools. De-
mand theories, such as the economic approaches to fertility that are often referred to as
the “new home economics” (Becker 1991; Willis 1973), have traditionally taken the first and
third condition as granted, and analyzed fertility behavior as an adaptation to changing
environmental conditions. Ideational and diffusion approaches (Cleland and Wilson 1987;
Montgomery and Casterline 1993), on the other hand, emphasize the first and third fac-
tor. They interpret conscious fertility control within marriage as an innovation and focus
on the diffusion or acceptance of this behavior. Supply theories (Easterlin and Crimmins
1985) emphasize the role of the third factor, the availability of methods to control fertility
and the biological context of reproduction.
We focus in this review of fertility theories and the causes of fertility transitions pri-
mary on the economic approach to fertility, which is usually associated with the new home
economics initiated by Gary Becker (Becker 1991). The scope of the new economic approach
to household behavior reaches far beyond fertility. At the same time, the demand for
children and its interaction with related household decisions constitutes a central concern
throughout the new home economics literature, and is an important question that contin-
ues to stimulate further empirical and theoretical developments. As currently employed,
most household models for the demand for children share certain features (Schultz 1997).
First, the traditional money income budget constraint is replaced by a time budget con-
straint, and considerable attention is devoted to the allocation of time between market
labor supply and non-market activities, especially for women. Second, demographic and
economic behaviors depend on the household stocks of human and physical capital, and
differences across individuals in their relative advantages of engaging in specific market
or non-market activities are an important determinant of a household’s time allocation.
Third, many models for the demand for children incorporate an explicit life-cycle perspec-
tive. Choices of individuals about human capital accumulation, marriage, saving, etc., are
therefore considered as interrelated decisions that need to be investigated jointly.
In a simple and commonly used framework of the demand for children, parents are
assumed to maximize lifetime utility, which depends for example on the number of chil-
dren (quantity of children), the education and health of the children (often referred to as the
quality of children), the leisure activities of the husband and wife, and other consumption
goods. Each input into the utility function can be thought of as being produced within the
home by combining both non-market time of the household members and market goods
according to a constant returns to scale production function. Except for the integrated
supply-demand framework by Easterlin and Crimmins (1985), the production function for
children in the classic new home-economics models does usually not include limitations
to the “supply” of children due to fecundity, mortality and child survival. The allocation of
each individual’s time is usually mutually exclusive and subject to an overall time budget
constraint. Market income is equal to lifetime wage rate, received by each member of the
family, times their market labor supply (plus additional non-labor income). The shadow
prices of the above commodities are then defined as the opportunity costs of market goods
and the household member’s time inputs used to produce one unit of the commodity. In
extension of this framework to overlapping generations models, parents exhibit intergen-
erational altruism and are concerned about the well-being of their children. This leads to
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a dynastic utility function (Becker and Barro 1988; Galor and Weil 1996). The utility of the
parents depends on the utility of its immediate offspring, and recursively on all future gen-
erations. The head of a dynastic family acts as if he maximizes the dynastic utility subject
to a budget constraint that depends on the wealth inherited by the head, the cost of rearing
children, and earnings in all future generations. Maximization of the resulting dynastic
utility usually implies an arbitrage condition for consumption over generations, and it has
important implications for intergenerational relations. According to this model, fertility,
but not the growth of consumption per descendant, responds to variations in interest rates
and the degree of altruism. More generally, fertility is also related to the growth in net
costs between generations, and transfers to children depend on the taxes and production
opportunities faced by children in the future (an assumption that has been questioned in
more recent studies; e.g. Lee and Kramer 2002).
The optimal choice of children, consumption, as well as the optimal allocation of time
and market goods to the various activities results in the above framework from utility
maximization within the time and money income budget constraint and given prices and
wages faced by the individuals in the household. Within this economic framework, fertility
will also be influenced by how economic change influences the costs and benefits of child-
bearing, and investments in child quality will importantly be influenced by the returns
to broadly defined human capital, which in part depends on mortality risks. Given the
time intensity of bearing and rearing children, the opportunity costs of time are of particu-
larly relevance in determining fertility. For example, technological progress and increasing
physical and human capital make labor more productive, raising the value of time in all
activities, which makes children increasingly costly relative to consumption goods. Since
women have had primary responsibility for childbearing and rearing, variations in the
productivity of women have been particularly important. For example, physical capital
may substitute for human strength, reducing or eliminating the productivity differential
between male and female labor, and thus raising the opportunity cost of children. Rising
incomes have shifted consumption demand toward non-agricultural goods and services,
for which educated labor is a more important input. A rise in the return to education
then leads to increased investments in education. Overall, these patterns have several ef-
fects: children become more expensive, their economic contributions are diminished by
school time and educated parents have higher value of time, which raises the opportunity
costs of childrearing. Furthermore, parents with higher incomes choose to devote more
resources to each child, and since this raises the cost of each child, it also leads to fewer
children (Becker 1991; Willis 1973). If parents wish to have a certain number of surviving
children, rather than births per se, then once potential parents recognize an exogenous in-
crease in child survival, fertility should decline. However, interactions between mortality
and fertility are potentially important. For example, increased survival raises the return on
postbirth investments in children (Kalemli-Ozcan 2003). Some of the improvement in child
survival is itself a response to parental decisions to invest more in the health and welfare
of a smaller number of children (Nerlove 1974). In addition, an increasing marketization of
societies and the expansion of government services may imply that governments and/or
market services replace many of the important economic functions of the traditional family
and household, like risk sharing, insurance and the provision of retirement income, further
weakening the value of children (Becker 1991). The extent to which family planning pro-
grams and contraceptive technologies affect fertility is hotly debated, and we return to this
question in Section 3.4 below.
Many of the above relationships between the fertility and its individuals and societal
determinants have been extensively studied. For example, one of the strong empirical
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relationships in developing countries that has received considerable attention from this
perspective of how opportunity costs shape fertility outcomes, is a negative association
between mother’s education and children ever born (Caldwell 1980; Kravdal 2002; Schultz
1997). Using aggregate data in developing countries, for example, Schultz (1997) finds—
consistent with the implications of the new home economics—that male education and in-
come from non-human-capital sources are associated with higher fertility. Kravdal (2002)
also suggests that education effects on fertility exist not only at the individual-level, but
also at the community level net of urbanization and her own education. Rosenzweig (1990)
and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) provide evidence for the quality-quantity trade-off in
developing countries by utilizing exogenous variations in the wage of children to infer
child-costs and the incentives for child-quality versus quantity, or using twin births as a
natural experiment. Evidence for this trade-off is also found using scholastic performance
as an indicator for child-quality Hanushek (1992), although some newer studies using gen-
der composition for the first-born children as instruments for overall fertility, have found
negligible quality-quantity trade-offs in some developed countries (Black et al. 2005). In ad-
dition, individual learning about fecundity has been shown as an important factor in the
determination of fertility (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1985), and uncertainty about socioeco-
nomic conditions during early adulthood has been shown to be an important motivation to
delay childbearing (Bernardi et al. 2008; Johnson-Hanks 2006). Using overlapping genera-
tions models, for example, Galor and Weil (1996) suggests that technological progress leads
to reduced fertility because it increases the ratio of women’s to men’s wages, thereby in-
creasing the opportunity costs of children and increasing the motivations to invest in child
quality. Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) argue in a recent study based on an overlapping gen-
erations model that cross-country differences in productivity and taxes go a long way to-
ward explaining the observed differences in fertility across contemporary developed coun-
tries, and Greenwood et al. (2005) point to the importance of the relentless rise in real wages
during the last 200 years in contributing to increased the opportunity cost of having chil-
dren, while at the same time, arguing that the baby boom during the 1950–60s is explained
by an atypical burst of technological progress in the household sector that occurred in the
middle of the last century that lowered the cost of having children. Substantial fertility de-
cline have occurred in societies across a broad range of development stages and across the
religious spectrum (Rosling 2012), with Muslim countries exhibiting somewhat fertility in
a recent study of 30 contemporary developing countries (Heaton 2011). This relationship,
however, is subject to considerable variability, and interestingly, the Muslim/Christian dif-
ference grows wider at higher levels of development and at higher levels of educational
achievement. In addition, long-standing differences in norms and beliefs about the appro-
priate role of women in society, and specifically with respect to the division of labor in the
household and female labor force participation, that are not necessarily tied to religion may
have important influences on fertility. For example, in a recent set of papers Alesina et al.
(2011a,b) also show that the form of agriculture traditionally practiced–intensive plough
agriculture versus shifting hoe agriculture–affected historic gender norms and perceptions
of gender equality, and that these norms and perceptions not only affected historical fertil-
ity levels but resulted in long-lasting fertility differences that continue to persist in contem-
porary contexts around the world today (for related analyses of post-WWII fertility trends,
see Fernández et al. 2004).
Recent economic theories have also developed more explicitly the decision processes
within households about fertility and related behaviors. For example, the above models
concentrate on a single decision-maker and disregard the fact that household decisions
usually involve more than one person who may not agree about the respective factor allo-
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cations. Various assumptions, such as Becker’s (1974) “Rotten Kid Theorem”, establish cir-
cumstances under which households act as if they were governed by a single, utility max-
imizing decision-maker. Empirical evidence, however, tends to contradict this assump-
tion (Haddad and Hoddinott 1994; Schultz 1990), and bargaining theories (Bergstrom 1997;
Lundberg and Pollak 1996) provide a sophisticated framework for analyzing this process
for fertility and other household decisions. Bargaining between partners (or spouses) can
have complex implications for fertility decisions because, among other factors, the abil-
ity to dissolve unions, the well-being outside marriage, or the withhold care or services
within a relationship are important determinants of bargaining power in these models. For
example, England and Folbre (2002) argue that primary care givers (usually mothers) usu-
ally have less bargaining power than parents whose contributions simply take the form
of financial support, and that this weakness in the bargaining process may not be fully
compensated by the less tangible, non-pecuniary resources that result from greater phys-
ical proximity and stronger emotional connection to the child. Within this view, less gen-
der specialization in the form of parental involvement could lead to improved outcomes
for children not only by improving mothers’ economic position but also by strengthening
emotional connections between fathers and children. Using similar views about gender
asymmetries in decision-making processes within and outside the family/household, Mc-
Donald (2000) argues that an increase in gender equity—and thus more gender-equal bar-
gaining power within families—is a precondition of a rise in fertility from very low levels
in developed countries, while at the same time, increased female bargaining power is a
necessary condition for achieving lower fertility.
It is well-known that the individual decision-making processes that are emphasized
in the economic frameworks of fertility do not necessarily result in an optimal fertility
level that maximizes some specific indicator of societal well-being like income per capita or
subjective well-being; or, for that matter, neither do individual decision-making processes
necessarily result replacement level fertility (for related discussions, see Lee and Mason
2012; Samuelson 1975; Strießnig and Lutz 2012). For example, it is an old observation that
individuals’ fertility decisions may deviate from the socially perceived optimum level of
procreation. Polybius (1927, 36.17.5–7) in the second century BC, for instance, lamented
about a decreasing population and a decline of cities because “men had fallen into such a
state of pretentiousness, avarice, and indolence that they did not wish to marry, or if they married to
rear children born to them, or at most as a rule one or two of them, so as to leave these in affluence”.
Instead of this concern for underpopulation, recent writers about the divergence between
individually and socially desired population growth were primarily concerned with over-
population. The reasons for this divergence are twofold: the first is that the relative prices
of goods and services that households face may simply be “wrong” due to market or pol-
icy failures. The second is provided by the ubiquitous phenomenon of externalities. The
externalities underlying this divergence of private and social incentives for low fertility
are mainly found in three areas. In Malthus’ model that emphasizes diminishing returns
and the finiteness of space as limits to population increase, the externality is pecuniary and
relates to the negative effect of an additional worker on the wage level. Alternative exter-
nalities can arise due to public goods or natural resources. An early modern formulation
of the “tragedy of the common” is provided by Hardin (1968). Motivated by this existence
of common resources, Demeny (1986) described the population problem as a prisoner’s
dilemma, in which each couple, acting in their self-interest, induces suboptimal collective
outcomes. The existence of a prisoner’s dilemma has been used to advocate population
policy and public intervention in individuals’ fertility decisions. Yet even if one accepts the
relevance of negative externalities, little is known about their magnitude. A study by Lee
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and Miller (1991) is one of the few attempts to estimate them in the context of developing
countries. Contrary to the expectation, “[f]or some countries widely viewed as having serious
population problems, the net total of these quantifiable externalities was close to zero” (p. 295). In
developed countries where concerns about low fertility are prominent, however, the exter-
nalities to childbearing are substantial. Instead of the negative spillovers that dominate the
concerns of excessive population growth, these arguments focus primarily on the positive
externalities to childbearing resulting from the existence of public transfer and related sys-
tems that—in their net effects—transfer resources from the younger to older generations.
In addition, as argued by Simon (1981) and Boserup (1981), a larger population could imply
a greater probability of increases to knowledge that is a public good (although this positive
effect is reduced if knowledge and information are shared relatively easily globally). In this
contexts, children tend to be associated with positive externalities, resulting in lower than
socially optimal fertility levels, because the discounted contributions of children to these
systems exceed the discounted benefits they receive.
In addition to the above focus on economic externalities, fertility models that include
social interaction and social learning have emphasized possibly positive externalities—or
spillovers—that arise because the adoption of reduced fertility by some parents contributes
to the erosion of traditional norms or pressures to conform (e.g., Kohler 2001). Other forms
of social interactions are possible, including also the returns to education or feedbacks af-
fecting the marriage market. For example, these externalities occur because the diffusion
of information is a path-dependent process and the choices of early adopters influence the
availability of information for later decision-makers (Kohler 1997).8 Externalities exist in
health behavior due to threshold phenomena in the spread of contagious diseases. Al-
ternatively, they emerge in economic development because the return to human capital
depends on the average level of education in a community. Or, as Goldin and Katz (2002)
argue, during the introduction of the pill that altered women’s career decisions in through
two pathways: a direct pathway that through better fertility control facilitated women to
invest in expensive long-duration training without the price of abstinence or a high risk of
unwanted fertility, and an indirect pathway in which the resulting delay of marriage in-
creased the size of the marriage pool at older ages, thereby reducing the costs of delaying
marriage in terms of the probability of finding an appropriate mate. Alternatively, positive
externalizes may occur due to increasing informational returns in social learning about
contraception and family planning. In particular, because information is to some extent
a public good, private providers are not likely to supply it in adequate amounts. This is
particularly the case when information (for example, about the possibility of controlling
fertility) cannot be easily tied to a specific marketable product. Thus, information about
rhythm and withdrawal has no private market, nor does information about the pill in rural
areas where there is no real market for private medical services. Yet the welfare gains to
individuals from accurate information of this kind may exceed the costs of providing that
information (e.g., Behrman and Knowles 1998).
The information problem may be particularly severe in the context of family planning
where the product is a complex set of ideas and procedures whose benefits are not imme-
diately apparent, but whose perceived risks may be high. In addition, much information—
8In the context of family planning programs, discussed in more detail in Section 3.4 below, evidence for rel-
evant social interaction effects on fertility is also provided by Freedman and Takeshita (1969), who report on a
controlled experiment in which blocks of neighborhoods in Taichung (Taiwan) were exposed to different informa-
tion about available family planning services, ranging from no explicit information to mailings and home-visits
of field representatives. About half of all women who accepted family planning after the initial information cam-
paign, heard about the program from friends, neighbors and relatives instead of the home-visits which provided
the second most important source of information.
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for example, regarding appropriate method and medical contra-indications—is client-spe-
cific and may be too sensitive and complex for the mass media to convey. Interactions
between family planning and other maternal and/or child health programs/policies are
also complex, with the benefits of the latter affecting the individual and societal costs and
benefits of family planning. The failure of a market for contraceptive information in these
contexts is frequently used to motivate family planning programs (see also Section 3.4 be-
low). These programs use visits by field workers as an adjunct to mass media advertising.
Alternatively, they may provide incentives for women to visit a health clinic and acquire
information about birth control. This policy intervention is different from many other in-
centive programs that try to reduce the number of children per couple. Information pro-
vision does not affect the desired fertility directly, but rather helps couples to achieve their
desired fertility level. Humanitarian or other objections, frequently raised in the context
of other population policies, are less severe with respect to pure provision of contracep-
tive information. Information provided by family planning programs, however, is not the
only possibility for women to learn about the availability or the properties of contraceptive
methods. The possibility of missing markets and policy failures emphasizes that diffusion
of information in social networks may be an important factor in contraceptive choice, and
market and/or policy failures provide an economic rationale for the high prevalence of
social learning in fertility decisions. A formal model of this diffusion is given in Kohler
(1997), and the combination of social learning with family planning efforts in empirical
studies may shed light on the different performance of these programs (Kohler et al. 2000).
Moreover, social learning implies positive externalities that affect fertility dynamics during
the demographic transition. These positive externalities, denoted informational increasing
returns, are associated with the adoption of modern contraception because a new user can
provide essential information to other women who are uncertain about the costs and ben-
efits of modern family planning and low fertility (Kohler 2001).
3.3. Population Growth, Demographic Dividends and Economic Development
Economic development is often seen as a sufficient condition for the decline of fertility as
virtually all developed countries have—at least in global comparison—low fertility rates
and low intrinsic growth rates (Figure 2) (Kohler 2010), even if among the most advanced
societies, fertility may slightly increase with development (Myrskylä et al. 2009). The more
interesting—and much more debated—question is if reduced population growth, and the
changes in the population age structure that result occur throughout the demographic tran-
sition, can possibly facilitate economic growth and development. This debate about the in-
teractions between population growth and economic development has a long history, with
influences of these debates on population policy ranging from the pessimistic approaches
following Coale and Hoover (1958), to the revisionist views expressed by the National Re-
search Council (1986). The former was decidedly neo-Malthusian and argued that rapid
population growth impaired economic development through its negative effects on saving
and capital dilution. The latter emphasized the ability of markets and institutions to adjust,
and argued that rapid population growth can slow economic development, but only un-
der specific circumstances and generally with limited or weak effects (Kelley 1988).9 This
9For example, the conclusions in National Research Council (1986) state: “On balance, we reach the qualitative
conclusion that slower population growth would be beneficial to economic development for most developing countries. A
rigorous quantitative assessment of these benefits is difficult and context dependent. Since we have stressed the role of slower
population growth in raising per capita human and physical capital, it is instructive to use as a benchmark the effects of
changes in the ratio of physical capital per person. A simple model suggests that the effect is comparatively modest. Using a
typical labor coefficient of 0.5 in estimated production functions, a 1 percent reduction in the rate of labor force growth would
boost the growth of per capita income by 0.5 percent per year. Thus, after 30 years, a 1 percent reduction in the annual rate
of population growth (produced, say, by a decline in the crude birth rate from 37 to 27 per 1,000) will have raised production
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report therefore ushered in period of uncertainty about the priorities that should be given
to population policies (Sinding 2009), as well as what the content of these policies should
be—a perspective that arguable fit well with the predispositions of the Regan Adminis-
tration in the USA, that announced at the 1984 International Conference on Population in
Mexico that “population growth is in and of itself neither good or bad; is a neutral phenomenon.
[. . . ] The relationship between population growth and economic development is not necessarily a
negative one.” In a continuation of this revisionist theme that downplayed concerns about
population growth, G. W. Bush declared during the 1991 World Population Week that “ev-
ery human being represents hands to work, and not just another mouth to feed” (cited in Cohen
1995a), and in the perhaps most optimistic perspective, Simon (1981) wrote in his book on
The Ultimate Resource, with the ultimate resource in the title referring to human ingenuity,
that “every trend in material welfare has been improving—and promises to do so indefinitely”.10
More recently, informed by new theoretical and empirical research in the last two de-
cades, the pendulum in the population and economic development debated has shifted
again. A revisionism revised perspective emerged (Birdsall et al. 2001; Sinding 2009) that
again reemphasizes important population–development interactions, including but not
only as a result of potential “demographic dividends” (Bloom et al. 2002) that can arise during
the demographic transition as a result of changes in the age structure after fertility starts
to decline in the demographic transition (for related reviews, including some specific to
the SSA context, see Birdsall et al. 2001; Canning 2011; Dyson 2010; Eastwood and Lip-
ton 2011; Kelley 1988; Sippel et al. 2011; Teller and Hailemariam 2011). In addition, on a
theoretical level, the unified growth theory (Galor 2005, 2011) has stipulated a new interest
in theoretical models integrating demographic change and economic development. Af-
ter a period where the revisionist perspectives have dominated the perceived wisdom on
the interaction between population and economic development, the interaction between
demographic change and economic development—including the role of family planning
programs and reduced fertility for economic growth—has received considerable new at-
tention on both the macro and micro level and utilizing both empirical and theoretical
approaches.
The Malthusian mechanism by which a high level of population reduces income per
capita may still relevant in poor developing countries that have large rural populations
dependent on agriculture, as well as in countries that are heavily reliant on mineral or
energy exports (Weil and Wilde 2009). For example, in a provocative simulation study cal-
ibrated to SSA contexts, Ashraf et al. (2008) study quantitatively the effect of exogenous
health improvements—for instance as a result of policy interventions that target infectious
diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis, or result in improvements of life expectancy
through better general health—on output per capita, accounting for the effects that these
health improvements have towards increasing population growth through the resulting re-
duction in mortality (a related study with similar findings is Acemoglu and Johnson 2007).
The striking finding of Ashraf et al. (2008) is that, due to increased rates of population
growth that follow from these policies or interventions as a result of reduced mortality,
the effects of the resulting health improvements on income per capita are found to be sub-
stantially lower than those that are often quoted by policy-makers, and may not emerge
at all for three decades or more after the initial improvement in health. This emphasis on
the Malthusian effects resulting from the more rapid population growth induced by health
interventions that reduce mortality is controversial (Arndt et al. 2009; Bleakley 2008, 2010),
and income per capita to a level 16 percent above what it would otherwise have been. This would be a substantial gain, but
by no means enough to vault a typical developing country into the ranks of the developed.”
10Quoted in Lam (2011).
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and depends critically on the assumptions how fertility and human capital investments re-
spond to health and other societal/technological changes that reduce the relevance of the
Malthusian mechanism (see Lam 2011 and our earlier discussion in Section 2); but, never-
theless, the findings highlight how higher population growth resulting from interventions
can potentially reduce the welfare and income gains resulting from improved health, and
as a result, the general equilibrium effect of these policies are less than the partial equilib-
rium effects suggested by most micro-studies.
On the other hand of the spectrum of population–development debate, the optimists
about the effects of population growth on economic development tend to emphasize the
positive contributions of population to innovation, efficiency in use of productive fac-
tors, scale economies in transportation and communication, or institutional change. In the
view of Boserup (1965, 1981), increases in population density induce shifts to more labor-
intensive farming, and the induced development of new tools and techniques (for example,
the plow) permits large increases in productivity. Urbanization has been seen as critical to
this process in both historical and contemporary contexts (Glaeser 2011; Jacobs 1969). In
one example documenting these interactions, Kremer (1993) constructs and empirically
tests a model of long-run world population growth combining the Malthusian idea, that
technology limits population, with endogenous technological progress. The model pre-
dicts that over most of history the population growth rate and the rate of technological
progress are proportional to the population size. Empirical tests support this prediction
and show that historically, among societies with no possibility for technological contact,
those with larger initial populations have had faster technological change and population
growth. The implication of the above models that high population density eventually leads
to modernization is qualified by Lee (1986, 1988). The question of institutional adjustment,
which weakens the effect of population growth on economic development, is crucially re-
lated to the question whether institutional adaptation is a necessary consequence of pop-
ulation pressure. Models with multiple equilibria and possible development traps raise
some doubts with respect to this deterministic institutional adjustment (Becker et al. 1990;
Dasgupta 1993; Galor and Tsiddon 1991). Instead of deterministic long-term moderniza-
tion, for example, Lee’s (1986; 1988) model also exhibits a ‘Malthusian trap’. Depending
on the initial combination of technology level and population size, and on the interaction
between wages and fertility, the population may either modernize and reach an equilib-
rium with relatively high income and technology levels, or it may converge to a Malthu-
sian situation where low levels of technology and low wages eventually restrict fertility.
This feature of multiple equilibria questions the view of the ‘pure’ optimists that economic
modernization is a deterministic consequence of population growth. Arthur and McNicoll
(1978), for instance, describe a situation in Bangladesh that seems to fit the description of
this trap. They report that peasants ‘seem quick to sense opportunities for even marginal
progress’ (p. 57), but social and economic pressures on families combine to push fertility
upward towards a high level, leading to declining wages and severe environmental prob-
lems. At the same time, these institutions, such as a lack of political and local organization
and a low status of women, seem to be self-enforcing. Although the authors see poten-
tial for socioeconomic change and modernization, they also question the improvement
through induced progress as outlined in the optimists’ perspective. More recently, Mc-
Nicoll (2011) have emphasized the divergent demographic and development paths of two
relatively resource-rich countries: Indonesia and Nigeria. A half century ago, Indonesia
and Nigeria appeared to be similarly placed in development level and both had high fertil-
ity and high mortality. In the interim period, however, these countries followed radically
different trajectories: Indonesia moved toward an East Asian style of growth accompanied
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by a progressive reduction of poverty, whereas in Nigeria growth stagnated, the economy
became increasingly dominated by oil and natural gas revenues, and poverty remained
undiminished. In addition, the demographic transition in these countries unfolded very
differently: while Indonesia currently has a life expectancy close to 70 years and fertility
averaging little over two births per woman, Nigeria’s life expectancy is still below 50 and
its fertility is above 5. McNicoll (2011) argues that this divergence in demographic and
economic trajectories during the last fifty years between Indonesia and Nigeria is due to
differences in governance and policy choice, in inherited resources and institutions, and in
external conditions. Specifically, with respect to fertility, McNicoll argues that differences
in institutional inheritance have been especially important, putting significant obstacles
in the way of a Nigerian fertility decline that were not present or could be fairly readily
overcome in Indonesia.
In a paper addressing the possibilities of a Malthusian trap that prevents long-term
modernization, Becker et al. (1990) combine a theoretical growth model with endogenous
fertility choice according to the new home economics. They argue that human capital
investments are an important part of modernization, and that parental decisions about
these questions are crucial for understanding fertility transitions. The analysis assumes
that the rates of return on investments in human capital rise rather than decline as the
stock of human capital increases, at least until the stock becomes large. The model ex-
hibits two equilibria, corresponding respectively undeveloped and developed economies
respectively. The latter is characterized by higher per-capita human capital and income,
and lower fertility. As a result of these multiple equilibria that result from the interac-
tion of individual-level returns to human capital and aggregate levels of human capital,
and undeveloped economy can be “stuck” at the high fertility low-development equilib-
rium unless sufficiently favorable technology becomes available or external shocks disrupt
the initial equilibrium. Becker et al. (1990) thus conclude that “history and luck are critical
determinants of a country’s growth experience” and that “[m]any attempts to explain why some
countries and continents have had the best economic performance during the past several centuries
give too little attention to accidents and good fortune.”11
The emphasis on initial conditions and exogenous shocks for the selection between
equilibria in the above model leaves the reader somewhat uncomfortable because it leaves
relatively little room for policy interventions or endogenous social processes that affect the
pace of fertility decline and development. Kohler (2000), for example, investigates this
selection of equilibria in terms of a coordination problem. Expectations emerge in this con-
text as a key determinant of the equilibrium selection. High fertility is rational as long
as high fertility is a predominant behavior in the population, and low fertility emerges as
a rational choice if a critical mass of other community members follows suit. The main
difference is that contemporary or future individual behavior is a potential source of diver-
gence in a society’s evolution, and that there is the possibility of self-fulfilling prophecies.
An economy may remain undeveloped with high fertility because everyone believes that
it will. Institutional contexts, including also the existence of inclusive or extractive polit-
ical institutions and elites emphasized in Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), are potentially
important determinants of such shared expectations and perceptions. However, if changes
in expectations occur, they can imply behavioral changes and may influence the long-term
equilibrium selection. Such expectation-driven equilibrium selection is particularly rele-
vant in fertility decisions. Specifically, expectations about future development trajectories
and social/economic conditions are important because many externalities associated with
11For a critical discussion of Becker et al.’s (1990) model and its ability to describe basic empirical patterns of
the onset of the demographic transition, see Galor (2005, 2011).
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fertility decision are local (Akerlof 1997; Dasgupta 1993, 1995). These local externalities
pertain either to the return on human capital investments as argued by the literature cited
above, or they pertain to the social acceptability of contraception, the prevalence of prona-
talist traditional customs, or social norms that affect the status of women. All of these fac-
tors are endogenous to the aggregate prevalence of fertility control in the population. They
imply that the incentives to reduce fertility depend, at least in part, on the behavior of other
community members. A transition from the high fertility equilibrium towards a persistent
fertility decline can be initiated if a coordinated critical mass of behavioral change occurs.
This observation provides a theoretical motivation for the ‘tipping’ or ‘threshold’ models
suggested by Schelling (1978) or Granovetter (1978).
Recently, the unified growth theory (Galor 2005, 2011) has elaborated on the above
mechanisms and has started to provide an integrated perspective on both demographic
change and economic development that is consistent with the demographic and economic
trends and patterns during the demographic transition. The motivation behind this frame-
work is the claim that the understanding of the contemporary growth process would be
limited and distorted unless growth theory would be based on micro-foundations that
would reflect the qualitative aspects of the growth process in its entirety. And while there
remain some controversies about whether the specific mechanisms postulated in these
models are consistent with the empirical evidence (Guinnane 2011), the dynamics of de-
mographic change and economic development—along with the dynamics of changes in
technology, human capital levels, fertility and mortality—is broadly consistent with the ob-
served patterns during the demographic transition. Most importantly for the present dis-
cussion, the unified growth theory suggests that the transition from stagnation to growth
is an inevitable outcome of the process of development. In the pre-transition Malthusian
period, the interaction between the level of technology and the size and the composition
of the population accelerated the pace of technological progress, and ultimately raised the
importance of human capital in the production process. Technological progress hence be-
comes sustained and cumulative, and agricultural techniques and the mechanization of
agriculture make the fixed factor, land, less important and less of a constraint for popula-
tion growth and improvements in living standards. Technological progress also leads to
new methods of production, and new research methods for producing new technologies,
which increase the returns to education. This leads to a quality-quantity trade-off: families
choose to have fewer children in order to allow investments in education that will make
these children better off. As a result, the rise in the demand for human capital in the second
phase of industrialization, and its impact on the formation of human capital as well as on
the onset of the demographic transition, brought about significant technological advance-
ments along with a reduction in fertility rates and population growth, enabling economies
to convert a larger share of the fruits of factor accumulation and technological progress into
growth of income per capita, and paving the way for the emergence of sustained economic
growth.
Two aspects of the united growth theory are important for the present discussion about
the determinants of the onset and pace of the fertility transition during the demographic
transition. First, the fertility transition within the framework of the unified growth the-
ory is triggered by the gradual rise in the demand for human capital that cause parents
to shift from child quality to child quantity (Galor 2011, 2012). Second, the theory argues
that international trade was an important reason for the differential timing of the demo-
graphic transition, including those occurring in the 2nd half of the 20th century in less
developed countries. In particular, contrary to the process occurring in developed coun-
tries, international trade in non-industrial economies generated incentives to specialize in
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to estimate the age profile of other private consumption. estimated private 
expenditures on health, education, and other consumption are adjusted to be 
consistent with niPa. (For details see lee et al. 2008 and mason et al. 2009.) 
For hunter-gatherers, total food production is calculated separately for each 
sharing group (which could be a collection of households or a larger group). 
it is then allocated to the individuals in the sharing group in proportion to 
standard caloric-need tabulations by age, sex, and sometimes body weight 
and level of physical activity (Kaplan 1994). Howell (2010) uses a variant of 
this approach.1
to facilitate comparison, we have formed an unweighted average of the 
Kaplan and Howell hunter-gatherer age profiles, which in any case are very 
similar. we have also made an unweighted average of the profiles for four of 
the lowest-income countries in our nta collection: Kenya, indonesia, Phil-
ippines, and india. Finally, we have formed an average of four of the richest 
countries in nta: Japan, the united States, Sweden, and Finland. in order 
to make the shapes of the age schedules visually comparable, we adjusted 
the level by dividing by the average level of labor income across ages 30–49, 
chosen to be affected neither by educational enrollment nor by early retire-
ment.2 the resulting age profiles are plotted in Figure 1. 
we note, first, the close similarity between the hunter-gatherer con-
sumption age schedule and that of the poor countries. although there are 
some differences, such as the decline in consumption at older ages in the 
hunter-gatherer profile but not in the poor-country profile, these may well 
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tions, and rich industrial populations: Consumption and labor income (ratio to average
labor income, ages 30–49)
Source: Lee and Mason (2011)
the production of unskilled intensive, non-industrial, goods. Hence, the absence of signifi-
cant demand for human capital reduced the incentives to invest in the human capital and
child quality, and the gains from trade were utilized primarily for a further increase in the
size of the population, rather than in the income of the existing population. As a result, the
demographic transition in these non-industrial economies has been significantly delayed,
increasing further their relative abundance of unskilled labor, enhancing their compara-
tive disadvantage in the production of skilled intensive goods, and delaying their process
of development. International trade therefore reinforced the “great divergence” in income
per capita across countries during the 19th and 20th century, and affected persistently the
distribution of population, skills, and technologies in the world economy. And yet, the pre-
diction of the theory is that the demographic transition, and the transition from stagnation
to growth have been merely delayed, and that ultimately the mechanisms and processed
emphasized above would result in both demographic and economic change.
A further important contribution that caused the pendulum in the debate about the role
of population change and economic development to reverse has been made by scholars
who shifted away from focusing on the size of the population, and explicitly recognized
different stages of the life course and the different economic contributions (positive and
negative) to economic growth at different stages of their life-course. Recent years have
brought about a hugely improved understanding of the economic life-cycle across over
time and across different stage of economic development (Lee et al. 2006; Lee and Mason
2011) (Figure 10). These distinct phases of the life cycle with different patterns of sav-
ings, intergenerational transfers, labor force participation and human capital have received
considerable attention as potentially important factors that determine the interactions be-
tween population growth and development. In particular, as the population age structure
changes during the demographic transition—as is for instance illustrated based on recent
and projected age structure changes for South Africa and all of SSA combined in Figure
11—the proportion of the population that are children (young dependents), working-age
adults (and thus net producers), and elderly individuals (who are net consumers in devel-
oped, but not necessarily among the less and least developed countries) shifts. Specifically,
during the next decades, the proportion of the population that is in working ages will in-
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Figure 11: Population age structure in South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, 1960, 2010,
and 2060
Source: Based on UN median projections (UN Population Division 2010c)
crease markedly in countries like South Africa, which has experienced a substantial decline
in fertility in recent decades (Table 1), as well as to a more modest extent in sub-Saharan
countries overall where the average pace of fertility decline has been slower (Figure 11).
This increase in the proportion of the population that is in working ages will be least pro-
nounced in the countries that continue to grow rapidly during the next decades, such as
the countries included in Table 2. Recognizing these shifts in the population age structure
during the demographic transition, several studies have started to investigate at the im-
pact on economic growth not only of population growth rates, but also of changing age
structures changes (Bloom and Canning 2004, 2008; Bloom et al. 2002). Specifically, this
literature hypothesized that economic growth might benefit from a one-time “demographic
dividend” caused by the fact that, as fertility falls, the fraction of the population in working
ages increases.
Part of this effect of age structure on per capita growth is arithmetic and follows from the
composition g(Y/N) = g(Y/L) + g(L/WA) + g(WA/N), where g(.) denotes the growth
rate, Y is output, and N, L and WA are respectively the size of the population, labor force
and working age population (for simplicity, we assume here no unemployment). If pro-
ductivity per worker (Y/L) and the proportion of the working age population that is in the
labor force (L/WA) are constant, an increasing share of the population that is at working
ages (i.e., g(WA/N) = −g(1 + dependency ratio) > 0) will necessarily increase the rate
of growth of per capita income. But the literature on the demographic dividend points
out that the effect of changing population age structure may be much stronger than this
merely arithmetic effect. For example, a fall in the dependency ratio—especially the fall in
the young dependency ratio that a fall in fertility following a decline in mortality will bring
about—may well induce more participation of females in the labor force and raise savings.
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There may also be more investment in child quality as fertility declines, and human capital
is likely to increase (most pronounced for women and children). As regards savings, if
the population is considered as consisting of dissaving dependents at both ends of the age
spectrum plus saving workers in the middle (Figure 10), then the early consequences of a
fall in fertility will be to raise savings ratios, by reducing the weight of young dissavers in
the population. It is also possible that falls in fertility simultaneously raise females’ par-
ticipation and savings, in which case both financial and labor-market conditions will favor
the investment that will facilitate gainful employment of the extra labor.
Proponents of the demographic dividend theory argue that these aspects are of con-
siderable importance for understanding the economic development in the context of the
demographic transition, and that the age-structure changes during the early stages of the
demographic transition, along with behavioral changes that cause it and result from it,
have been an important factor in the rapid growth that have been described as the East
Asia’s “economic miracle” and Ireland’s emergence as a “Celtic Tiger”. To test this hypoth-
esis about the impact of age structure changes on economic growth, the recent literature
on the demographic dividend has estimated versions of models of the form g(Y/N) =
φ+ Xβ+ δ(Y/L) + γg(WA/N), where γ indicates the effect of changes in age in the pro-
portion of the population in working ages—which tends to increase as fertility declines—
on per capita income. The arithmetic dividend that follows from only the increase in the
proportion of the population that is at working ages would imply that γ = 1. Empirical
estimates for γ, however, range from 1.5 to 3.5—with the higher of these figures obtained
for African countries (e.g., Bloom et al. 1998, Table 6). These effects therefore suggest that
the “demographic dividend” resulting from age structure changes substantially exceeds the
arithmetic effect that follows from the compositional change by 50–200%, and this addi-
tional effect of increases in the fraction of the population in working ages results from
changes in fertility, savings, human capital and female labor force participation that occur
as part of the demographic transition. Using related analyses that document that higher
dependency ratios (including both youth and old-age dependency ratios) have a significant
impact on growth, Kelley and Schmidt (2005) conclude that, worldwide, the combined im-
pacts of demographic change have accounted for approximately 20% of per capita output
growth impacts, with larger shares in Asia and Europe.
However, the literature on the demographic dividend also emphasizes that, both the-
oretically and empirically, the link from demographic change to economic growth is not
automatic (Bloom et al. 2002). There is an important role of initial conditions and path
dependence (see above). Age distribution changes merely create potential for economic
growth. Whether or not this potential is captured depends on the policy environment,
including for instance the quality of governmental institutions, labor legislation, macroe-
conomic openness management, seems to trade, and education policy. According to Bloom
and Canning (2008), this is the realm where Latin America stumbled during 1965 to 1990,
and economic performance lagged behind that of East and Southeast Asian countries de-
spite similarly favorable demographic conditions. During East and Southeast Asia, but
its economic performance well behind. And the policy and institutional environment is
of course critical for evaluating the potential of a demographic dividend in sub-Saharan
Africa (Eastwood and Lipton 2011; Sippel et al. 2011). While Bloom et al. (2007b) find that
the relationship between demographic change and economic growth in Africa is much the
same as in other regions, primarily those sub-Saharan African countries with good insti-
tutions and increasing shares of the population in working-ages are likely to be the ones
that will reap a demographic dividend. However, from the perspective of analysts worried
about future population growth, these likely beneficiaries from the demographic dividend
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are the countries that have already made most progress in reducing fertility and main-
taining economic growth. Hence, a more pessimistic assessment about the prospect of a
demographic dividend in SSA high fertility countries is provided by Eastwood and Lipton
(2011) who point out that, in comparison with the Asian experiences, many SSA countries
have been characterized throughout the demographic transition by more rapid popula-
tion growth rates and lower savings rates. In particular, while slower population growth
will indeed raise sustainable consumption per head by reducing the savings that would be
needed to sustain capital per person, this prospect pales into insignificance beside the likeli-
hood that savings will fall far short of the level necessary for a sustained growth during the
period when demographic conditions provide a context for a demographic dividend. In
addition, Eastwood and Lipton (2011) question whether fertility declines—many of which
have stalled and/or are progressing slowly (Bongaarts 2008; Ezeh et al. 2009)—will be suf-
ficiently fast to allow for the changes in dependency ratios that are currently suggested by
UN median population projections.
In addition to cross-country and longitudinal country analyses, a related recent litera-
ture that exploits naturally occurring “natural experiments” (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000)
has strengthened the case for important interactions between population change and eco-
nomic and social development. Bleakley and Lange (2009), for example, investigate the
eradication of hookworm disease from the American South (circa 1910), arguing that this
eradication was principally a shock to the price of child quality because hookworm de-
presses the return to human capital investment, had a very low case-fatality rate, and had
negligible prevalence among adults. Consistent with the quality-quantity trade-off model
for fertility, Bleakley and Lange (2009) find that a decline in the hookworm-infection rate
from 40% to 20% was associated with a decline in fertility that amounts to 40% of the entire
fertility decline observed in the Amecican South between 1910 and 1920; the eradication
of hookworm was also associated with a significant increase in school attendance and lit-
eracy, and the combined effect of reduced fertility and increased child quality potentially
importantly contributed to economic development. Focusing on variation in fertility more
directly, Bloom et al. (2009a), for example, estimate the effect of fertility on female labor
force participation in a panel of countries using abortion legislation as an instrument for
fertility, documenting that that removing legal restrictions on abortion significantly reduces
fertility and increases female labor force participation since, on average, a birth reduces a
woman’s labor supply by almost 2 years during her reproductive life. As a result, Bloom
et al. (2009a) argue that that behavioral change, in the form of increased female labor sup-
ply, contributes significantly to economic growth during the demographic transition when
fertility declines. Similarly using variation in access to abortion as a factor affecting fertility,
Pop-Eleches (2006) examines educational and labor outcomes of children affected by a ban
on abortions that was introduced in 1966 in Romania. Birth rates doubled in 1967 because
formerly abortion had been the primary method of birth control. Controlling for socioeco-
nomic differences in abortion use prior to 1966, the analyses find that children born after the
ban on abortions had worse educational and labor market achievements as adults. There
is also suggestive evidence that cohorts born after the introduction of the abortion ban had
inferior infant outcomes and increased criminal behavior later in life. Acemoglu and John-
son (2007) exploit the large improvements in life expectancy driven by international health
interventions, and find that GDP per capita and GDP per working age population show rel-
ative declines in countries experiencing large increases in life expectancy—an effect that is
possibly due to the more rapid population growth induced by these life expectancy gains
(for a critical perspectives on these findings, see Bloom et al. 2009b). Emphasizing these
negative effects due to more rapid population growth in response to health interventions
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in developing countries, Ashraf et al. (2008) evaluate changes in the prevalence of malaria
and tuberculosis on health, productivity and population growth and conclude that the ef-
fects of health improvements on income per capita are substantially lower than those that
are often quoted by policy-makers, and may not emerge at all for three decades or more af-
ter the initial improvement in health. Ashraf et al. (2008) thus argue that efforts to improve
health in developing countries should rely more on humanitarian rather than economic
arguments, since the economic growth consequences of such interventions may be small
and occurring only after a significant delay.
3.4. The Role of Family Planning Programs and Related Policies
In the context of our previous discussions, an obvious question to ask, and yet a com-
plicated question to answer, is whether family planning programs have made important
causal contributions to declines in fertility, the attainment of other development goals (such
as the Millennium Development Goals), and economic development. And if so, if these
programs are suitable and cost-effective policy instruments to address the concerns about
population growth and bring about progress in individual well-being.
In the 2nd half of the 20th century, family planning programs have been the primary ap-
proach in developing countries to address rapid population growth, high fertility and un-
intended childbearing, and poor reproductive health outcomes. The these programs have
tried to help individuals satisfy unmet need by increasing the supply of and access to con-
traception, as well as reduce other obstacles to contraceptive use such as fears about side
effects, husband/familial disapproval, or lack of information/knowledge about contracep-
tion and/or the benefits of reduced fertility (see also Section 3.4). Usually less explicit be-
cause of the potential concerns about interfering with individual’s/couple’s reproductive
decision-making, programs have also tried to affect the level of desired fertility—which the
notion of unmet needs takes as a given—through reductions in the costs of fertility regula-
tion, and reforms—such as restrictions on child labor or expansion of required schooling—
that affect the costs and/or benefits of children (Schultz 2007). More recently, programs
have also included a broader focus on reproductive and child health outcomes (Bongaarts
and Sinding 2011a).
The first major family planning program was established in India in 1951, and by 1975
about 74 developing countries had established them (for reviews of family planning pro-
grams and their effectiveness, see Cleland et al. 2006; Joshi 2011; Population Council 2012;
Robinson and Ross 2007; Seltzer 2002; Shiffman and Quissell 2012; for a recent broader
discussion of population policies, see also Das Gupta et al. 2011; Demeny 2011; May 2012).
During the 1980s, international interest in family planning program lost momentum, in
part as a result of the “revisionist thinking” about population growth (Section 3.3) and in
part in response to criticisms that these programs sometimes had problems in the imple-
mentation and were unpopular (Seltzer 2002). In addition, feminist critics argued that these
programs were not integrated with a broader reproductive rights-based agenda, as a result
of which women paid a high price for population policies since they were often viewed
as passive “targets” who had to become “acceptors” of contraception (Dixon-Mueller 1993),
and increasing opposition from religious groups (for a response to these criticisms of fam-
ily planning programs, see Bongaarts and Sinding 2009). More recently, in light of the de-
mographic trends highlighted in Section 2 and newer evidence about the effectiveness of
family planning programs that is reviewed below, family planning programs—especially
when they are broad-based, female-focused, voluntary and respectful of human rights—
have regained some of their momentum and are receiving renewed attention (Bongaarts
and Sinding 2011a,b; Cleland et al. 2006, 2012; Turner 2009). The rationale for these pro-
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grams in recent discussions is therefore twofold (May 2012; Shiffman and Quissell 2012):
first, the reproductive health rights argument that emphasizes the right of individual women
(and couples) to control their reproduction, helping them to attain meaningful and healthy
lives; and second, the ecological argument that rapid population growth and high fertility
imply individual-level and societal-level negative consequences—such as slower economic
development, environmental degradation, or poor health outcomes—which could be re-
duced though family planning programs that help reduce fertility and population growth.
In reviewing the evidence about family planning programs, which is often based on
the experience in Asian and Latin America, and assessing the applicability of these find-
ings to the current high fertility countries (Figure 4), specifically also those in SSA, it is
useful to highlight some of the broad differences in family planning programs across these
regions (Joshi 2011). On the one hand, in Asia (and mainly East and South Asia), most
family planning programs aimed specifically at curtailing population growth through ex-
plicit policies such as the promotion of contraception and/or incentives for fewer children.
On the other hand, in Latin America the programs were mostly promoted with the aim
to achieve broader aims such as improving child and maternal health, rather than just re-
ducing fertility. In contrast, African family planning programs were often implemented
without explicit population policies, and they were often run by outside donors that were
relatively small in scale (Joshi 2011). Kenya and Ghana, for example, established family
planning programs in the late 1960s, and Tanzania did so in 1970. Senegal established an
urban family planning program in 1976 and a rural program in 1979. Much of Franco-
phone Africa, however, lagged behind this movement and remained largely untouched by
the wave of interest in family planning programs throughout this period. Even where they
were established, program in Africa often differed from their Asian counterparts. First,
the focus was almost entirely on temporary methods, since permanent methods were re-
garded as culturally unacceptable (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987); however, establishing of
a reliable supply chain and relatively easy access to family planning services proved to
be challenging in an African context due to a relatively weak health system infrastructure
(Caldwell et al. 1992). Second, African family planning programs were supported by a
large number of international donors who rarely coordinated their actions with national
governments or even among themselves, resulting in programs that were fragmented, rel-
atively small scale and often subject to short-term budget cycles—all of which is in contrast
to Asian and Latin American programs that were typically run by Ministries of Health and
were backed by long-term budget commitments.
Despite these differences in implementation and design, family planning programs
have in common that they emphasize relatively low levels of contraceptive use as a pri-
mary proximate determinate of high fertility. The reasons for not using contraception in
high fertility contexts are often thought to include high levels of desired fertility, a lack of
knowledge about the existence and availability of contraception, insufficient contraceptive
supplies and services, the cost of contraception, an exaggerated fear of side effects, and
opposition from spouses and other family member. Family-planning programs therefore
often go beyond the narrow provision of physical access to contraceptive supplies and ser-
vices, but also aim at reducing other obstacles of contraceptive use as well—including, for
instance high levels of gender inequality, lack of female autonomy or knowledge about con-
traception, husband’s opposition or social disapproval of family planning (Cleland et al.
2006). And if the arguments by Ashraf et al. (2008) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) have
merit that the higher population growth resulting from mortality-reducing health interven-
tions can potentially reduce the welfare and income gains that would otherwise result from
improved health, family planning programs should potentially be integrated and jointly
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implemented with other health interventions that aim at reducing infectious diseases or
improving general health (for example, in the context of the Copenhagen Consensus 2012
project, Canning 2012 highlights this point in the discussion of infectious disease interven-
tions).
Family planning programs can affect the costs of reducing fertility, both through subsi-
dizing the cost of contraceptives and making them more readily available, thereby reduc-
ing the costs of obtaining/accessing contraceptives. Family planning programs can also
increase the information about family planning methods and the potential benefits of re-
duced fertility, and they can potentially affect preferences for children either directly or
through processes such as social influence or peer pressures (Section 3.2). Family planning
programs can thus affect desired fertility, as well as help to reduce unwanted and mistimed
birth—with the latter being representing a significant fraction of births in developing coun-
tries. For example, each year about 184 million pregnancies occur in the developing world,
and 40% of these (74 million) are estimated to be unintended because they occur when
women want to avoid or delay pregnancy (Singh et al. 2010). These unintended pregnan-
cies end in abortions (48%), unintended births (40%), or miscarriages (12%) (Bongaarts and
Sinding 2011a).
Proponents of family planning programs have long argued that these programs are ef-
fective and have made an important contribution to fertility declines during the 2nd half
of the 20th century (Bongaarts et al. 1990; Bongaarts and Sinding 2011a; Cleland et al.
2006; Lapham and Mauldin 1985; Turner 2009). In a recent analysis, for example, Popu-
lation Council (2012, Ch. 2) compares pairs of countries that are relatively similar in terms
of social, economic, cultural and religious characteristics, but where one country imple-
mented a large-scale family planning program and the other did not. Such country-pairs
include (with the country with a family planning program in italics): Bangladesh and Pak-
istan, Kenya and Uganda, Iran and Jordan. In all of these pairs, the country with the family
planning program (Bangladesh, Kenya and Iran) has experienced more rapid fertility decline
after the implementation of the program than the matched comparison country. While the
matching of comparison countries based on characteristics is an advantage of the analyses
in Population Council (2012) as compared to earlier studies that related country and/or
regional measures of family planning efforts to fertility declines, this line of research is
often criticized because it is potentially subject to an endogeneity of family planning pro-
gram measures that would tend result in an overestimation of the causal contribution of
the program. It is also possible to find counter-examples; as (Lam 2012) points out, Colom-
bia’s fertility decline, which as associated with a very large family planning program, was
about the same pace and magnitude as that of Brazil, which had virtually no organized
family planning program (see also Potter et al. 2002). In several studies, therefore, after
controlling for the possible endogeneity of the program effort, it has been frequently not
possible to infer a significant (in a statistical sense) or relevant (in terms of relative magni-
tude) influence of family planning programs from aggregate country data (Schultz 1994).
In a recent study in Indonesia, McKelvey et al. (2012) also question that the use of mod-
ern contraception is price-elastic, i.e., is responsive to one important dimension—the price
of contraception—that is affected by family planning programs. In particular, McKelvey
et al. (2012) exploit substantial variation in in prices and incomes that were induced by the
economic crisis in the late 1990s and show that monetary costs of contraceptives and levels
of family economic resources have a very small (and well-determined) impact on contra-
ceptive use and choice of method—although it is not clear if this finding is specific to the
particular Indonesian context.12 The most prominent critique of family planning programs
12For an earlier study of family planning use during the Indonesian financial crisis, see Frankenberg et al.
Hans-Peter Kohler
Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012
Population Growth 35
has been provided by Pritchett (1994) who compared total fertility rates with various mea-
sures of wanted or desired fertility to argue that fertility variation between developing
countries was mainly determined by desires for children, with 90% of fertility differences
between countries being explained by differences in desired fertility, and that the claims
that family planning affect fertility levels stems from inferring causation from association.
More recent analyses that utilize the more extensive DHS data on wanted fertility (Lam
2011), which have become available since Pritchett’s (1994) analyses, essentially continue
to find the same results: an overwhelming fraction (83%) of the cross-country variation in
TFR is explained by cross-country variation in wanted fertility. Hence, while unwanted
fertility clearly exists in virtually all contexts, the evidence does not suggest that countries
with higher levels of fertility have a larger gap between actual and wanted fertility. Based
on his analyses (and consistent with the more recent analyses in Lam 2011), Pritchett (1994)
thus concluded that the best way to reduce fertility is to change the economic and social
conditions that make large families desirable, rather than investing in family planning pro-
grams13—a conclusion that caused considerable controversy at the time (Bongaarts 1994;
Knowles et al. 1994). In light of these criticisms, Miller (2010) for instance summarizes
the proponent’s view on the effectiveness of family planning programs with “believes about
the importance of family planning programs are at times stronger than the evidence that supports
them.”
While significant skepticism prevailed during the 1990s about the effectiveness of fam-
ily planning programs, a recent literature has begun to shift the evidence about the role
of family planning. For example, Gertler and Molyneaux (1994) analyzed the contribu-
tions of family planning programs, economic development, and women’s status to Indone-
sian fertility decline from 1982 to 1987, and after controlling for the targeted (nonrandom)
placement of family planning program inputs, concluded that 75% of the fertility decline
resulted from increased contraceptive use, but was induced primarily through economic
development and improved education and economic opportunities for females. And while
the direct effect of family planning explained only about 4–8% of the decline in fertility, the
dramatic impact of the changes in demand-side factors (education and economic devel-
opment) on contraceptive use and fertility was possible only because, as a result of the
established family planning programs in Indonesia, there already existed a highly respon-
sive contraceptive supply delivery system. Montgomery and Casterline (1993) use regional
time-series analysis to study the impact of Taiwan’s family program. In addition to finding
a direct effect of this program on fertility trends, they infer from the positive autoregres-
sive behavior of fertility that there is clear evidence in support of within-township, but
only weak evidence for across-township diffusion of fertility control that acts as a social
multiplier of the direct program effects (see also Rosero-Bixby and Casterline 1994). Lam
(2011) points out that the longitudinal analyses of changes in fertility yields a very different
picture than the cross-sectional analyses of actual and wanted fertility in Pritchett (1994)
(and updated in Lam 2011). In particular, declines in wanted fertility explain 53% of the
mean decline in TFR, and the remaining 47% of the decline occurs without any change in
wanted fertility—suggesting that women have improved their ability to achieve their fer-
tility targets, possibly (in part) as a result of improved access to and/or knowledge about
contraception. Miller (2010) studies the regional expansion of the family planning program
in Colombia in the 1970s, the timing of which is thought to have been largely determined
(2003). I am grateful to Lam (2012) for pointing out these Indonesian studies.
13Pritchett (1994) points to the fact that family planning programs can improve the timing of first births, with
have lifelong socioeconomic implications for mothers, and that these benefits can provide a better reason for
justifying family planning programs rather the declines in fertility per se.
Hans-Peter Kohler
Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012
Population Growth 36
by exogenous factors. The study finds that exposure of a woman to family planning from
age 15 to 44 during the 1970s is associated with a reduction in cumulative fertility in 1993
of 5% (about one-third of a child), explaining about 6–7% of the fertility decline in Colom-
bia’s major population centers during 1964–93 (and this contribution of family planning
is similar to those identified by Gertler and Molyneaux 1994). Hence, other factors—such
as socioeconomic changes occurring during the same period—were more important deter-
minants of the reductions in life-time fertility. The effect of the family program increases
to reductions in life-time fertility of 10–12% for women who started to use contraception
as a result of the program in the late 1960s and 1970s. In addition to declines in fertil-
ity, exposure to the family planning program when women were teenagers resulted in
improvements in her educational attainment of 0.05 years, and an increase by 7% in the
probability of working in the formal sector, an inter-generational increase in her children’s
schooling, and a delay in a child’s first birth—the latter potentially being most important
for the socioeconomic gains resulting from the family planning program exposure while
being a teenager. The study also finds evidence that mothers with longer community ex-
posure to family planning programs are associated with children who are more likely to
be attending school, have completed more years of education, are less likely to work in
the formal sector, and are less likely to have already had a child of their own by the time
of the 1993 census. Similar conclusions are obtained by Pörtner et al. (2011) who evaluate
the effects of family planning in Ethiopia, using a novel set of instruments that are based
on ordinal rankings of area characteristics, motivated by competition between areas for re-
sources. Access to family planning is found to reduce completed fertility by more than one
child among women without education, while no effect is found among women with some
formal schooling. These findings therefore also suggests that family planning and formal
education act as substitutes, at least in the low-income, low-growth setting of Ethiopia.
Pörtner et al. (2011) conclude that these results support the notion that increasing access
to family planning can provide an important, complementary entry point to kick-start the
process of fertility reduction. Such effects of changes in access to family planning are not
restricted to developing countries. Following up on Goldin and Katz’s (2002) analyses on
the “power of the pill” in the United States, for example, Bailey (2006) use plausibly exoge-
nous variation in state consent laws to evaluate the causal impact of the pill on the timing
of first births and extent and intensity of women’s labor-force participation. The results
suggest that legal access to the pill before age 21 significantly reduced the likelihood of a
first birth before age 22, increased the number of women in the paid labor force, and raised
the number of annual hours worked.
Several other studies also point to the broader impacts of family planning programs
beyond their effect on fertility. Specifically, cross-sectional analyses suggested that birth
to young mothers and births following short birth intervals were associated with elevated
mortality risks, and that by reducing these risky births, family planning programs would
contribute to declining infant mortality (Bongaarts 1987). For example, Rosenzweig and
Schultz (1982) finds that in urban areas in Colombia the availability of medical services—
including in particular also family planning activities—in addition to mother’s education,
are associated with child mortality and fertility within a birth cohort of mothers. The least
educated mothers were the most strongly affected in terms of a reduced fertility and in-
creased child survival by these local urban health programs (similar results are also found
by Miller 2010); no effects of program interventions and medical facilities are found on
rural populations, even though both child mortality and fertility are lower for more edu-
cated rural women. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982) additionally show that services such as
governmental health, education and family planning programs are more effective in shift-
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ing resources from increasing family size to augmenting human capital per person when
they are provided jointly. In particular, the results show that reductions in the costs of
medical services, contraceptives and schooling and the improvement of water sources are
mutually reinforcing alternatives for implementing the joint policy goals of reduced popu-
lation growth and increased human capital formation. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986) find
that family planning programs have positive effect children’s health (as measured by child
height) in the Philippines, suggesting that family size and child health might be gross sub-
stitutes, which might explain why some areas had a family planning clinic but not a health
clinic. Do and Phung (2010) also emphasize the potential positive consequences of children
being “wanted”, which is important as family planning programs are likely to reduce “un-
wanted” fertility and increase the fraction of children that are wanted by their parents. In
particular Do and Phung (2010) exploit the fact that in Vietnam the year of birth is widely
believed to determine success. As a result, cohorts born in auspicious years are 12 percent
larger, and Do and Phung (2010) argue that this increase is primarily driven by wanted fer-
tility. Comparing siblings with one another, those of auspicious cohorts are found to have
two extra months of schooling (despite the larger cohort size in auspicious years), lending
support to the conclusion that children benefit from being “wanted” in terms of schooling
and possibly other child outcomes (for a related earlier study with similar findings, see
David 2006; Dytrych et al. 1975). Instead of focusing on unwantedness, using twins data
and estimates from China, (Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009) study the consequences of hav-
ing an extra child as a result of a twins birth and find that an extra child at parity one or at
parity two, net of one component of birth-endowment effects associated with birth weight,
significantly decreases the schooling progress, the expected college enrollment, grades in
school and the assessed health of all children in the family. Nevertheless, despite the ev-
ident significant trade-off between number of children and child quality in this Chinese
context, Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) conclude that the contribution of the one-child pol-
icy in China to the development of its human capital was modest, primarily because the
effect of the one-child policy on fertility was assessed to have been relatively small.
All of the above studies are potentially affected by econometric problems that hamper
studies relying on observational data and that try to identify causal program effects—if
they make any attempt to do so at all—by relying on longitudinal observations that allow
controls for fixed effects, and/or instruments that affect family planning programs, and
outcomes such as fertility only through their effect of family planning (for a discussion,
see Moffitt 2005, 2009). While not without their own set of limitations (Deaton 2010; Duflo
et al. 2007; Moffitt 2005), the most convincing evidence about the effects of family plan-
ning program is often thought to be derived from controlled experimental designs that
allocated family planning programs across regions or villages in a randomized fashion.
Fairly early evidence from such randomized experiments exist that family planning pro-
grams affect contraceptive uptake, both through direct exposure to the program as well
as through social networks. For example, Freedman and Takeshita (1969) report on a con-
trolled experiment in which blocks of neighborhoods in Taichung (Taiwan) were exposed
to different information about available family planning services, ranging from no explicit
information to mailings and home-visits of field representatives. About half of all women
who accepted family planning after the initial information campaign, heard about the pro-
gram from friends, neighbors and relatives instead of the home-visits which provided the
second most important source of information. Mailings had virtually no effect on increas-
ing women’s propensity to adopt family planning. There is also a substantial amount of
evidence in the form of responses from women in (focus-group) interviews who state that
friends and neighbors were either important sources of information about contraceptive
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methods, or that the consent of friends was an important factor in their decision to use
contraception—which may importantly contribute to the social multiplier effects that have
been associated with family planning program efforts (Kohler 2001; Montgomery and Cast-
erline 1996). Six month after the program, TFR declined more rapidly in Taichung as com-
pared to other cities—6.4 vs. 3.1%. Sunil et al. (1999) report on a Ammanpettai Family Wel-
fare Program controlled experiment, which used an monetary incentive program, combined
with a motivational program using trained contact persons who visited and followed up
with eligible women in the program area, to encourage contraceptive use among rural In-
dian women. While Stevens and Stevens (1992) found that the a modest cash incentive for
3–5 months attracts very large numbers of women to a clinic where they learn about and
are provided with the pill, condoms, or the IUD, Sunil et al. (1999) show that the motiva-
tional programs were more likely to improve long term use of temporary family planning
methods than cash incentive programs, suggesting that peer-based family planning edu-
cation and training in community work to contact persons who make door to door visits
to promote family planning programs can be an important part of these programs.
While the above family planning experiments can be used to document the effect of the
program on contraceptive uptake, it is not useful for answering the more important ques-
tions of whether this update of contraceptive use contributed to declines in fertility and/or
if these declines in fertility translated into broader socioecomomic gains. Unfortunately, as
Schultz (2007) observes, “Half a century of experience with implementing family planning pro-
grams throughout the world has produced few experimental evaluation studies which document the
long-term consequences of family planning programs on family welfare. Estimating even the effect of
programs on completed fertility of cohorts are rare and instead comparisons of adoption rates of new
contraceptive methods or short run period birth rates are reported, few of which are experimentally
designed, or statistically matched using propensity score methods or other satisfactory evaluation
methods.” One important exception to this statement is the Matlab Family Planning Exper-
iment that was designed as a social experiment in a remote rural area of Bangladesh, in the
Matlab Thana, in Bangladesh.14 This family planning program was initiated in half of 141
villages for which there was already in place a reliable demographic surveillance system of
the population, registering all births, deaths, marriages and population movements.15 The
family planning program outreach effort was started in October 1977, which contacted in
their homes all married women of childbearing age every 2 weeks, offering them various
methods of birth control. The populations were periodically censussed and then randomly
sampled in a comprehensive socioeconomic survey in 1996. A census in 1974 confirmed
that the program treatment and comparison villages did not differ significantly 3 years be-
fore the program started in terms of their surviving fertility, approximated by the village
ratio of children age 0–4 to women age 15–49. A difference-in-difference change between
the program and comparison villages pre-program and post-program indicates that by
1982 surviving fertility is 17% lower in the program areas, and remained 16% lower in the
1996 survey after the program was in operation for nearly two decades. Fertility is lower
in the program areas only for women less than age 55, presumably because women over
14The discussion of the Matlab program and its evaluation here follows closely Schultz (2007) and Schultz
(2010).
15Miller (2010) points to some the criticisms that are often raised in the context of the Matlab experiment:
(i) there is suggestive evidence that true randomisation was not fully achieved (Joshi and Schultz 2007); (ii) the
Matlab family planning treatment was often considered too expensive to be financially sustainable without con-
siderable external support—program expenditures per fertile women and per averted birth were roughly 10%
and 120% of per capita GDP, respectively (35 times more than mean family planning spending in other Asian
countries at the time) (Pritchett 1994); and (iii) because health services were integrated into the family planning
treatment four years after the experiment began, it difficult to isolate long-run consequences uniquely attributable
to family planning alone (Phillips et al. 1984).
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55 were over 37 in 1977 when the program started, and these older women had essentially
completed their childbearing at that time and hence their fertility did not respond to the
program treatment (Joshi and Schultz 2007). It is possible to show that, subsequent to the
Matlab family planning program, women age 25–55 in 1996 had about one child less in
the program villages compared with the comparison villages. These women in program
villages were healthier measured by their BMI being 1.0–1.5 units higher than in the com-
parison villages, and their children experienced a death rate by their fifth birthday which
was 25% lower in the program villages. Moreover, girls age 9–14 and 15–29 had obtained
about one-third of a standard deviation more years of schooling for their age and sex in
the program areas, whereas the boys had obtained about half a standard deviation more
schooling. The estimated program effect on the boy’s schooling was statistically signif-
icant at the 5% level, whereas this schooling effect was not significant for girls. On the
other hand, girls age 1–14 were reported to have a significantly higher BMI in the pro-
gram villages, normalized for age, whereas there was no significant difference in BMI for
boys (Joshi and Schultz 2007). Through the gains in BMI for women, the family planning
may also contribute to extended benefits in terms of lower mortality for a period of up to
20 years (Menken et al. 2003). Women age 25–54 in 1996 also report monthly earnings a
third higher in the program villages compared to the other villages, and the households in
which women reside have proportionately more financial, agricultural, non-agricultural,
and housing assets, more consumer durables and jewelry and household tube wells in the
program villages (Schultz 2009). The wages of young men and women, age 15–24, did not
decline—as would be predicted by Malthusian diminishing returns—in the program vil-
lages despite the tendency for there to be fewer children in these villages and they were
more likely to attend school. Moreover, the wage rates for adult males age 25–54 are no
higher in program areas than in the higher fertility comparison villages—in contrast to the
wages of adult women that were at least one-third higher. The program also seems to have
improved cognitive function at ages 8–14 among children who were eligible for the Maltab
child health interventions in early childhood (Barham 2012).
Schultz (2010) concludes that, based on the study of the long-run consequences of
policy-induced voluntary reductions in fertility in the Matlab program, “in this poor ru-
ral South Asian region, a concerted outreach program achieved a significant decline in fertility and
sustained lower levels of fertility for two decades, during which fertility has declined substantially
in both groups of villages. This policy-induced reduction in fertility is associated with women and
children being in better health, sons receiving more schooling, and women earning proportionately
more in the paid labor market, and living in households with proportionately greater assets.” These
consequences of the family planning program are important, among other reasons, because
they have been achieved in a rather impoverished agrarian context with low female edu-
cation and low female labor force participation. Of course, based on a single study, it is
difficult to asses if similar outcomes would follow from family planning programs in other
parts of the world.
The Navrongo project in Ghana provides some evidence that some of the basic conclu-
sions of the analysis of the Matlab experience will also hold in an SSA context, although it is
not yet possible to make inferences about equally long-term effects of the family planning
and health programs as for the Matlab project. Like the Matlab Project, the Navrongo Com-
munity Health and Family Planning Project is a quasi-experimental study designed to test
the hypothesis that introducing health and family planning services in a traditional African
societal setting will introduce reproductive change. At the core of the project is a four-cell
study design, where in three randomly assigned regions a new basic primary health-care
and family planning program were instituted in addition to the standard clinic-based ser-
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vices provided by the Ministry of Health. The fourth region maintained the standard ser-
vices only and is used as the comparison area for the project. Debpuur et al. (2002) show
that knowledge of methods and supply sources increased as a result of exposure to project
activities and that deployment of nurses to communities was associated with the emer-
gence of preferences to limit childbearing. Fertility impact is evident in all treatment cells,
most prominently in areas where nurse-outreach activities are combined with strategies
for involving traditional leaders and male volunteers in promoting the program. In this
combined cell, the initial three years of project exposure reduced the total fertility rate by
one birth, comprising a 15 percent fertility decline relative to fertility levels in comparison
communities. In addition, Phillips et al. (2006) show that the arm of the experiment that
focused exclusively on delivering health services to women and their children succeeded
in reducing childhood mortality rates by half but had a negligible impact on fertility, while
the arm that focused on community-mobilization strategies and volunteer outreach led to
a 15% reduction in fertility. This lends support to the argument that increasing access to
contraceptive supplies alone fails to address the social costs of fertility regulation; effec-
tive deployment of volunteers and community mobilization strategies offsets the social
constraints on the adoption of contraception. In addition, the Navrongo program—and in
particular the provision convenient and easily accessible nursing care—has also resulted in
significant reduction in infant and child mortality (Pence et al. 2007). As a result, the study
claims that affordable and sustainable means of combining nurse services with volunteer
action can accelerate attainment of both the International Conference on Population and
Development agenda and the MDGs.
In addition, Ashraf et al. (2010) emphasize that in a SSA context, intra-household dy-
namics in contraceptive adoption may be of particular importance in how family plan-
ning programs affect contraceptive uptake and fertility, which has important implications
for the design of these programs.16 In particular, Ashraf et al. (2010) find that women in
Zambia who were given access to birth control individually, rather than in the presence
of their husbands, were 23% more likely to visit a family planning nurse and 28% more
likely to receive a concealable form of birth control, leading to a 57% reduction in un-
wanted births. In addition, providing cheaper and more convenient forms of birth control
through a voucher program led to a reduction in unwanted births only when women were
also given full autonomy over accessing these new methods. Specifically, using compar-
isons that approximate the impact of lowering barriers to accessing modern contraceptives
while maintaining family planning policies that limit women’s autonomy over these meth-
ods, such as through de facto spousal consent requirements that are still in place in much of
SSA, Ashraf et al. (2010) find higher contraceptive use, but not a decline in unwanted fer-
tility, in response to the program. Hence, it seems that the intervention primarily changed
contraceptive use among women who were already fairly successful in preventing un-
wanted fertility. The findings by Ashraf et al. (2010) hence suggest that excess fertility in
settings such as Zambia is not necessarily driven by the high cost of birth control; instead,
unwanted fertility might be reduced by technologies or policies that shift control of fertility
control from men to women.
4. COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS 2012: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR REDUCING POP-
ULATION GROWTH IN HIGH FERTILITY COUNTRIES
Given the current debate that focuses on the role of family planning programs in address-
ing concerns about rapid population growth in some of the world’s least developed coun-
16I am grateful to Lam (2012) for pointing out this study.
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tries, we focus our benefit-cost calculations on family planning programs. In evaluating the
benefits of these programs, the discussion in this 2012 Copenhagen Consensus Perspective
Paper focuses on the implications of population growth on economic development, the
potential effects of family planning programs on development as well as various measures
of individual well-being. It is important to point out that there are several other implica-
tions of population growth that are not considered here, including the role of population
growth on climate change, political instability and conflict. While these aspects are po-
tentially importantly related to population change, their evaluation is beyond the scope of
this paper (for a discussion of these issues, suggesting possibly large benefits in terms of
environmental sustainability and reduced climate change from slower population growth,
see for instance the recent Royal Society of Science report on “People and the planet” by Sul-
ston et al. 2012, or the analyses of carbon emissions and population growth in O’Neill et al.
2010). The benefit-cost ratios presented below therefore are likely to be lower bounds to
the extent that reduced population growth would result in additional benefits in domains
such as climate change, political instability and conflict.
5. CHALLENGES OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSES OF POLICIES TARGETED AT RE-
DUCING POPULATION GROWTH
Conceptually, benefit-cost analysis is straightforward. Simply compare the benefits with
the costs—if the benefits exceed the costs, or equivalently the benefit-cost ratio exceeds
one, then an intervention is warranted (e.g., Belfield and Levin 2010). The benefits are sim-
ply the sum of the present discounted values of the weighted impacts of the interventions.
Likewise the costs are simply the sum of the present discounted values of the real resource
costs of the intervention. The devil—and the challenges—however, as usual are in the de-
tails. Before embarking on the benefit-cost considerations for family planning programs,
therefore, it is important to highlight the challenges in doing so. Our review of the liter-
ature highlights the many uncertainties in assessing the determinants of fertility decline
across a range of very different social and institutional contexts, and in assessing the role
of family planning programs in facilitating declines in fertility and the attainment of other
development goals. Moreover, the most robust empirical evidence is based on the Asian
experience during the 2nd half of the 20th century, and with respect to family planning
programs, the Matlab experiments in particular. The extent to which these findings are
applicable to a contemporary SSA context, i.e., the world region with the highest concen-
tration of high fertility countries (Figure 4), is at least somewhat uncertain. But even after
acknowledging the limitations of the empirical evidence for conducting benefit-cost cal-
culations, other problems remain. Some examples follow (see also Behrman et al. 2004;
Behrman and Kohler 2011):
1) Range of Impacts: As we have highlighted above, family planning programs and re-
duced fertility are likely to have a range of impacts. On the micro-level, these impacts are
potentially incurred by individuals, their families, and their offspring and/or parents. On
the macro-level, these impacts may include economic development, which we will con-
sider as part of the assessments in this paper, but also aspects such as climate change,
political instability and conflict, which are not considered here due the lack of detailed
empirical studies that could inform benefit-cost evaluations in this domain.
2) “Prices”: Impacts generally are multiple and measured in different units, but must be
combined into the same units (normally monetary units with prices as weights) in order to
sum them and in order to compare them with costs. For some impacts conceptually at least
the measurements are relatively straightforward—for instance, market prices for the value
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of increased labor productivity or reduced use of medical goods and services under the
assumption that such prices reflect the true social marginal value of the relevant good or
service. But for other impacts, this evaluation is much more challenging. The key example
for this project is the value of adverting mortality. A range of methods have been proposed
in the literature—for example, the lowest-cost alternative means of adverting mortality
(Summers 1992, 1994) and the revealed preference as reflected in wage-risk choices in labor
markets (Aldy and Viscusi 2007; Hammitt 2007; Robinson 2007; Viscusi 1993, 2010). A
related question is what prices should be used. For example, should prices (including
wages) be used for a poor SSA developing country or for Denmark—under the argument
that a life should be valued the same whether it be in a low- or a high-income country?
How these questions are answered can make an enormous difference for the present project
in which adverted mortality is a major impact. For example, Summers (1992) reports that
the cost of saving a life through measles immunization was on the order of magnitude of
$800 per life saved in the early 1990s or about $1250 in 2004 (adjusting for inflation and the
costs of raising resources Behrman et al. 2004), while in a recent publication Bartick and
Reinhold (2010) use $10.56 million per death in 2007 US dollars. For the present project, all
of the Assessment Papers are using the same two alternatives—DALYS of $1,000 per year
and $5,000 per year—to assure consistency within the project with regard to this critical
assumption.
3) Range of costs: What is of interest for the costs are the total true resource costs to
society. These are not identical to governmental budgetary expenditures, though often an-
alysts seem to assume that they are. On one hand governmental budgetary expenditures
in some cases include substantial transfer components (e.g., in Conditional Cash Transfer
programs), which typically involve some but much smaller resource costs than the amount
of the fiscal expenditures. On the other hand, private costs and distortionary costs of rais-
ing funds for governmental programs may be considerable. Many programs, for example,
may require time inputs from individuals that are not typically covered by governmen-
tal expenditures. Distortion costs of raising resources for governmental expenditures also
have been estimated to be on the order of magnitude of 25% of those expenditures or more
(e.g., Ballard et al. 1985; Devarajan et al. 1997; Feldstein 1995; Harberger 1997; Knowles and
Behrman 2003, 2005). Because cost estimates vary considerably, it is important to present
estimates that illustrate how robust the benefit-cost ratios are to different cost estimates.
4) Discounting: The costs and, probably even more the benefits, may be distributed
over a number of years. But the value to society of resources in the future is less than the
value of the same resources now because they can be reinvested if they are available now.
Therefore future costs and benefits should be discounted to the present for comparability,
particularly for costs and benefits that are likely to occur some time into the future. And
the discount rate makes a difference. For instance, the present discounted value (PDV) of
$1,000 received in 20 years is $553 if the discount rate is 3%, $377 if the discount rate in 5%
and $149 if the discount rate is 10% (and for 40 years, the respective PDVs are $306, $142
and $22). However there is a lack of agreement about what discount rates are appropri-
ate, though rates in the 3%–10% range are common for the social sectors. For the present
project, all of the Assessment Papers are using the same two alternatives—discount rates
of 3% per year and 5% per year—to assure consistency within the project with regard to
this critical assumption.
5) Interactions among policies: Of necessity we consider family planning programs in iso-
lation. But clearly, these programs are often embedded in other policy interventions (such
as programs targeting the HIV/AIDS epidemic in SSA), and even if they are not explicitly
integrated in such programs, the impact of family planning programs will likely depend
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on policies that affect access to health care and/or schooling. The policies will also de-
pend on social and economic institutions, as the extent to which such institutions changes
as a result of either the development process itself or specific policy interventions. Hence,
variation across countries with respect to institutional and policy contexts is likely to have
substantial implications on the consequences of scaling up family planning programs—
but little systematic knowledge exists that would allow the incorporation of these aspects
in the benefit-cost calculations pursued here.
6) Value of lives not born: Family planning programs, through their effect of fertility, affect
the size of the population. This of course gives rise to the question on how to consider the
welfare of persons who may not be born as a result of the intervention—a question that
has been notoriously difficult to answer and for which no consensus exists in the literature
(for discussions of this issue, see for instance Golosov et al. 2007; Razin and Sadka 1995).
In our analyses, we follow Ashraf et al. (2011) and related studies and will not consider in
the evaluation of family planning programs the welfare of individuals who are not born as
part of the program.
7) Scale: Scale can come into estimation of benefit-cost ratios in at least four ways. First,
there may be high benefit-cost interventions that are effective for only a small select pop-
ulation, and therefore are not likely to be of interest for the present project with its broad
perspective. Second, there may be interventions that have high benefit-cost ratios on a
small scale but that are difficult to scale-up because critical dimensions of the small-scale
intervention (e.g., high-quality and particularly dedicated staff) cannot be maintained if
the intervention is scaled-up. Third, there may be important aggregate effects that result
from reduced fertility due to family planning programs, including important aggregate im-
pacts on economic growth. Family planning programs that are implemented on a large—
possibly national or even regional—scale can potentially affect population dynamics, and
through the effects of reduced population growth and changes in age structure, can af-
fect economic development and individual incomes. Programs that are implemented on
a smaller scale, however, are unlikely to affect aggregate population dynamics, and any
feedback from aggregate population change on the benefits resulting from family planning
program is likely to be absent or minimal. In addition, effects of reduced fertility on the in-
centives to invest in child schooling or health may depend on the scale of the program, and
the fraction of the population that is reached by family planning programs. In our analyses,
we will focus on fairly large scale comprehensive programs that have implications on both
the micro and macro level. And while detailed analyses of how the scale of programs af-
fects the benefits (and possibly costs) resulting from such program seem impossible given
the state of the literature, it is important to acknowledge the scale of programs in interpret-
ing the results.
7) Estimation challenges: The estimation challenges for obtaining benefit-cost ratios are
enormous not only for the reasons noted above, but because of the difficulties in obtaining
good response estimates due to endogenous behavioral choices, unobserved variables, se-
lectivity of samples, and different market and policy contexts to which large numbers of
academic studies have been devoted. Our above review of the literature reflects these un-
certainties. For example, for many family planning programs, both program effects and the
costs associated with potentially effective programs are difficult to pin down, and scaled-
up programs may have different effects and be subject to different costs than programs
that have been implemented as part of research studies. Moreover, an important body of
evidence stems from one specific program, the Matlab family planning in Bangladesh, that
was relatively expensive relative to GDP per capita and the findings of which may nor
may not translate to other contexts. One could therefore conclude that the task of estimat-
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ing benefit-cost ratios is so difficult that it would be better to abandon it. But that would
leave society with little systematic guidance about policy choices in this important area.
Therefore, in hopes of improving the basis for policy guidance, we swallow hard and pro-
ceed boldly and hopefully creatively (and hopefully not too foolhardily) to make the best
estimates that we can given the present very imperfect information and strong assump-
tions necessary, with some efforts to explore the sensitivity of our estimates to important
alternative assumptions.
6. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSES FOR POLICIES TARGETED AT REDUCING POPULA-
TION GROWTH
6.1. Costs of Contraception and Family Planning Programs
Several recent studies provide estimates of the costs of expanding family planning pro-
grams and contraceptive services in developing and high fertility countries. Evaluations
of family planning programs during the 1980s have estimated the costs per averted birth in
developing countries ranging from around $45 (Philippines, Jamaica, Thailand, Sri Lanka)
to $260 (Latin America and the Caribbean), with some estimates being higher (reported
in Pritchett 1994, and converted to 2010 USD). Levine et al. (2006) estimates costs of birth
averted that range from $87 in Latin America and the Caribbean to $131 in sub-Saharan
Africa and $163 in East Asia and the Pacific (all 2001 USD).
Because recent research has demonstrated the broader implication of family planning
programs for health and economic outcomes (see Section 3.4), the recent literature on fam-
ily planning de-emphasizes the costs per birth averted and focuses on the costs of ser-
vice and cost of different health outcomes associated with family planning programs (see
below). For example, some estimates of the costs of family planning programs focus on
satisfying the demand for contraception as indicated by unmet need. Estimates by the
Guttmacher Institute suggest that of the 818 million women who want to avoid a preg-
nancy (in 2008), 603 are using modern contraceptives and 215 million are not and are con-
sidered as having unmet need (Singh et al. 2010). The majority of women with unmet
need are estimated to live in sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 12, obtained from this Guttmacher
Institute report, shows that the current annual cost of providing modern family planning
services to 603 million users in the developing world was about $3.1 billion (about $5 per
women using family planning), including costs of contraceptives and related supplies, la-
bor costs of health workings and program and other public health systems costs. These ser-
vices are paid for by a combination of domestic sources including taxes and private sector
contributions, employer and employee contributions to health insurance, and out of pocket
payments by service users. Expanding family planning services to all women with unmet
needs—a total of 215 million women—would require an additional annual expenditures
of $3.6 billion, bringing the total to $6.7 billion annual. 75% of these additional expenses
would be required for program and other systems costs related to expanding family plan-
ning services, while only 16% would be required for the supplies and contraceptive com-
modities.17 Based on these estimates, the per-person costs of expanding service to women
with unmet needs in developing countries is close to $17, more than three times the costs
as for current users of family planning services. These costs are broadly consistent with
estimates for a sub-Saharan context (Kenya) (Figure 13) (USAID Health Policy Initiative
2010) that range from $2.74 (IUD) to $13.42 (implant) per couple-year of protection. Costs
17It is difficult to assess based on Singh et al. (2010) and related reports how quickly, if at all, programs could
be family planning programs could be expanded to reach the unmet need of all women in the developing world
or SSA, even if the additional funds were provided.
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Adding It UpGuttmacher Institute 17
ing their total number of births influence their choices 
of contraceptive methods: Those wanting to stop child-
bearing are likely to use one of the most effective meth-
ods (sterilization or a long-acting reversible method, such 
as the IUD), while those wishing to postpone a birth 
choose among reversible methods.
One in four women who want to avoid a  
pregnancy are not using a modern method
Of the 818 million women who want to avoid a pregnancy, 
603 million are using modern contraceptives and 215 
million are not (Figure 3.1).49 More specifically,
n 17% use no method;
n 9% use traditional methods (e.g., periodic abstinence 
and withdrawal), which do not require trained provid-
ers or supplies, but may require couple training and have 
high failure rates among users;
n 43% rely on a reversible modern method of contracep-
tion that requires trained providers, continuous sup-
plies or both (i.e., IUDs, oral contraceptives, injectables, 
implants, and condoms and modern vaginal methods); 
and
n 31% have had a tubal ligation (contraceptive steriliza-
tion) or have a partner who has had a vasectomy (female 
sterilizations outnumber male sterilizations by 10 to one).
*The World Bank classifies countries according to gross national 
income (GNI) per capita. In this report, we use this classification sys-
tem, collapsed into three groups: low-income countries, which have 
a GNI per capita of less than $936 (e.g., most of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Haiti, Afghanistan and Bangladesh); lower-middle–income countries, 
which have a GNI per capita of $936 –3,705 (e.g., India, Egypt and 
China); and upper-middle– or high-income countries, a category that 
combines two World Bank designations because high-income develop-
ing countries account for only 2% of the developing-world population. 
Countries in this category (e.g., Mexico, Turkey and South Africa) 
have a GNI per capita of at least $3,706.
In 2008, two-fifths of the 186 million pregnancies that 
occurred among women aged 15–49 in the developing 
world were unintended; that is, they were the result of 
contraceptive nonuse, incorrect or inconsistent method 
use, or method failure.49 Women with unmet need for 
modern contraceptives account for a disproportionate 
share—82%—of unintended pregnancies: Sixty-six per-
cent are among women using no method, and 16% are 
among those using traditional methods. The three-fourths 
of women who use modern contraceptive methods account 
for 18% of unintended pregnancies.
As with other indicators of reproductive health, low-
income countries* and Sub-Saharan Africa are dispro-
portionately affected: Seventeen percent of all women who 
want to avoid a pregnancy live in low-income countries, 
and 9% live in Sub-Saharan Africa; these women account 
for about 34% and 23%, respectively, of all unintended 
pregnancies in the developing world.49 
Unmet need for modern contraceptives is  
concentrated in the poorest regions
Some 215 million women in the developing world as a 
whole have an unmet need for modern contraceptives; 
they account for about 15% of all women aged 15–49.49 
The level of unmet need varies markedly across regions 
and among groups of women. Unmet need is
n concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Central 
Asia—regions that together account for 59% of all women 
with unmet need;
n disproportionately high in low-income countries—54% 
of women who want to avoid a pregnancy in these coun-
tries have unmet need for a modern contraceptive method, 
compared with 20% in better-off developing countries;
n higher among women who are younger, have less 
education and live in rural areas than among older, 
better educated and urban-dwelling women; and
n higher among poorer women than better-off women 
(33% of women in the poorest quintile experience unmet 
need, compared with 15% of those in the richest quintile).
Unmet need is about twice as high among women who 
want to delay a birth as among those who want no more 
children—40% vs. 20%.49 The difference largely reflects 
that women who want to delay a birth are much more 
Notes Estimates are for 2008 for all developing countries. Components may not add  
 up to totals because of rounding. “Current levels of care” meet only part (74%) 
 of existing need for modern family planning. “100% use of modern methods”  
 meets all existing need for modern family planning. Program and other  
 systems costs include costs for program management, supervision, training of 
 personnel, health education, monitoring and evaluation, advocacy, informa- 
 tion systems and commodity supply systems, and costs for maintaining and  
 expanding the physical capacity of health facilities.
Source Reference 49.
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Providing modern family planning to all who need it 
would cost $3.6 billion more than is currently spent.
Figure 3.2
Figure 12: Cost of providing family planning services in developing countries
Source: Singh et al. (2010)
at NGO facilities are estimated to b somewhat higher. Increasing the ontraceptive preva-
lence of modern methods by 1 percentage point during on year in K nya—from 39.5%
(2008) to 40.4%—requires n additional 97,200 users (accounting for population growth)
and is estimated o require expendi ure of about $1.4 millions in terms of commodities
and personnel (given current distribution of family planning methods), or about $14 per
additional user. The costs are estimated to be considerably higher per additional user if the
contraceptive prevalence were to be increased by about 20 percentage points as such an
increase would require substantial additional investments in health service infrastructure
that is not requir d for a more modest increase of only 1 percentage point (for a recent dis-
cussion of the health syste s strengtheni g efforts that are required for the implementation
of successful family planning programs, see Population Council 2012, Ch. 3).
It is also importa t to emphasize that a mere improvement in supply of and access to
family planning is unlikely to be adequate to achieve significant changes in family planning
use, and the concept of unmet need is correctly criticized for suggesting this (Bongaarts and
Bruce 1995; Lam 2012; Pritchett 1994). In addition to supply-side factors, the reasons for
the non-use of family planning often include fears about side effects, husband/familial
disapproval, or lack of information/knowledge about contraception and/or the benefits of
reduced fertility (Sedgh et al. 2007; see also Section 3.4). Peer pressures and social network
influences can also be important factors resulting in non-use (Kohler et al. 2001; Lyngstad
and Prskawetz 2010). And, of course, th level of desired fertility—which the notion of
unmet needs takes as giv n—can be targeted by policies that affect the costs and/or ben-
efits of children or the costs of fertility regulation (E sterlin and Crimmins 1985; Pritchett
1994; Schultz 2007). Hence, in order to be effective, family planning programs of n in-
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For comparison, the study team calculated the average 
cost per CYP at NGO-operated clinics (see Figure 7). 
Costs at the NGO clinics (run by Marie Stopes and 
Family Health Options Kenya) were slightly higher than 
those at government facilities, mainly due to higher 
salary levels and because women are often seen by 
higher-paid staff such as clinical officers and doctors for 
methods that at government facilities would be provided 
by nurses (IUDs, implants). 
Figure 7. NGO Facility—Costs per CYP, US$, 
2009 
 
Cost of Increasing Contraceptive 
Prevalence by One Percentage Point 
The study team estimated how much it would cost to 
increase modern contraceptive prevalence in Kenya by 
one percentage point in 2009. Based on the preliminary 
KDHS 2008/09 and United Nations population data, 
there were 1.9 million women or couples who were 
using modern FP methods in 2008. A one percentage 
point increase in CPR to 40.4 percent by 2009, together 
with an expected 2.3 percent increase in the number of 
married or in union women of reproductive age, would 
result in an additional 97,200 users, bringing the total 
number of modern method users to almost 2.0 million. 
Table 2 shows the number of new users/acceptors who 
would be expected to seek FP services at government 
facilities in 2009, if the share of government-sponsored 
FP services remained constant. 
Table 2. Projected Number of New FP Users by 
Method with One Percentage Point Increase, 
2009 
 Total Government facilities 
Pills 17,984 8,722 
Condoms 4,496 728 
Injectables 53,953 33,181 
Implants 4,746 2,909 
IUDs 3,997 1,954 
Sterilization 11,990 6,462 
TOTAL 97,166 53,956 
Using cost per new user/acceptor for the different 
methods (as presented in Figure 6 above), the total direct 
cost of providing these new users with FP services at 
government facilities would come to almost $1.4 million 
in 20096. About US$436,000 or 32 percent of costs 
would be for commodities; about US$920,000 or 68 
percent of costs would be for personnel (see Table 3). 
These numbers include only direct costs to government 
facilities where current utilization is low; a one 
percentage point increase could easily be absorbed by 
the existing infrastructure and human resources, 
although researchers found utilization varied 
considerably between facilities and regions. 
Table 3. Cost of Providing FP Services to 
Additional Number of Users at Government 
Facilities, US$, 2009 
 Commodity Personnel Total costs 
Pills $37,323 $64,289 $101,612 
Condoms $3,405 $893 $4,298 
Injectables $149,282 $4,711 $153,993 
Implants $99,396 $81,085 $180,481 
IUDs $1,569 $81,134 $82,703 
Sterilization $144,731 $689,929 $834,660 
TOTAL $435,706 $922,041 $1,357,747 
                                                          
6 This constitutes only a small portion of the total government FP 
costs. 
Figure 13: Cost of providing family planning services in Kenya (government clinics) per
couple-year of protection
Source: USAID Health Policy Initiative (2010)
clude demand generation through media campaigns and related behavior change communi-
cation in order to stimulate and/or motivate individuals to desire birth spacing or limiting,
seek out family planning services and adopt contraceptive method use (Population Coun-
cil 2012, Ch. 4). Inter ersonal communication through commu ity leade , health workers
and has been shown to be an important aspect contributing to the effectiveness of family
planning programs (Arends-Kuenning 2001; Freedman and Takeshita 1969; Munshi and
Myaux 2006; Phillips et al. 2006; Sunil et al. 1999; Valente and Saba 1998), as are program
designs that increase women’s autonomy in contraceptive decision-making (Ashraf et al.
2010). Several studies have also documented the effects of media campaigns and related
behavioral change communication on the adoption of contraception and family planning
(Freedman 1997; Jensen and Oster 2009; La Ferrara et al. 2008; Valente and Saba 2001),
which is expected based on emphasize the diffusion of innovation and social interactions
(Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Cleland and Wilson 1987; Kohler 2001; Montgomery and
Casterline 1996). Based on the existing literature, however, the costs of these components
of family planning programs are difficult to assess in general and are likely to be relatively
country-specific. Rather than trying to account for these costs directly, we conduct in our
concluding section sensitivity analyses that document the robustness of our benefit-cost
ratios with respect to a potential underestimation of program costs.
A different approach of assessing the costs of family planning is taken by Moreland
et al. (2010), who try to estimate the family planning implications of the different UN pro-
jection scenarios (see Section 2).18 The (undiscounted) cumulative family planning costs
for the 45-year period between 2005–50 for sub-Saharan is estimated to be $178 billions
for the median variant (Figure 7), with costs ranging from $156 billions for the high fer-
tility variant and $198 billions for the low fertility scenario (the present value of family
planning costs, discounted at 4%, are $60.7 billions (medium variant), $68.4 billions (low
variant) and $52.6 billions). The costs include commodities and personnel costs, but not
necessarily the costs of scaling up the health systems to facilitate the service provision for
these scenarios. Three aspects of these estimates are particularly noteworthy: first, the con-
18Moreland et al. (2010) base their caclulations on the 2008 version of the UN World Population Prospects,
rather than the most recent 2010 version. The differences of assessing the costs of family planning programs
between these versions are likely to be minor.
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traceptive costs of achieving the any of the three UN scenario are fairly substantial, with
the discounted family planning costs for the 45-year period (excluding health systems cost
such as potentially required expansions of the health care system; see Population Council
2012 Ch. 3 for a discussion) corresponding to about 6% of the sub-Saharan annual GDP.
Second, the difference in discounted family planning costs between the UN high and low
scenario is about 30%, corresponding to a difference in 2050 projected SSA population of
about 478 millions and a difference in the 2005–50 population growth rate of .58 percentage
points (between the 2.24% growth rate during 2005–50 in the high and the 1.66% growth
rate in the low fertility scenario). Third, based on the difference in UN population projec-
tions for 2050, an averted birth during the period 2005–50 corresponds to family planning
costs of $32, and a reduction in the 2050 sub-Saharan Africa population of 1 person entails
discounted family planning costs of about $33. Or stated differently, by extrapolating these
numbers, a reduction in the population growth rate by 1 percentage point during 2005–50
would entail discounted family planning costs of about $27 billion (or about 3% of current
SSA GDP).
Rather than estimating family planning costs based on the commodity and personnel
costs required for attaining specific fertility trajectories, such as the UN median scenario
(see above), it is also informative to consider costs of past family planning programs. The
Matlab family planning experiment (see Section 3.4) is widely considered to have been
fairly expensive (and was thus potentially financially unsustainable), with annual program
expenditures of about 10% of per capita GDP per fertile woman; in contrast, the Profamilia
program in Colombia had program costs of about .1% of GDP per capita (or about 1/100th
of the Matlab cost relative to income) (Miller 2010; Pritchett 1994). The reasons for these
large differences in program costs are not fully transparent; they are possibly related to the
fact that the Matlab program was explicitly established to evaluate a best-practice family
planning program in a resource-poor context, with considerable resources devoted to the
program implementation and the development of the relevant infrastructure; the Colom-
bian family planning program, on the other hand, built on existing health infrastructure
within a more developed context (and higher initial per capita GDP).
6.2. Benefits I: Reduced Expenditures on Health, Schooling, Etc.
The benefit of family planning programs has often been assessed in terms of savings on
social programs as a result of a less rapidly growing size of birth cohorts, with savings
including a reduced need for expanding the school system, providing education, imple-
menting immunization programs or providing health care for children. Family planning
program also reduces costs of maternal health programs or programs to provide water and
sanitation due to less rapid population growth. In a recent policy brief on “What would it
take to accelerate fertility decline in the least developed countries?”, the UN estimates that “for ev-
ery dollar spent in family planning, between two and six dollars can be saved in interventions aimed
at achieving other development goals” (UN Population Division 2009; based on calculations in
Bernstein 2006). A related report for Kenya (Figure 14), under the heading , estimates that
family planning expenditures of $71 million during period 2005–15 are associated with so-
cial sector cost savings of $271 millions—a benefit-cost ratio of close to 4:1 (USAID Health
Policy Initiative 2009b). Corresponding estimates in the literature vary widely. For exam-
ple, due to smaller costs associated with satisfying the demand for unmet needs, USAID
Health Policy Initiative (2009b) estimates a ratio of social cost savings for each dollar spent
on family planning of 13 to 1 for El Salvador, and a 1984 study estimated of costs savings
in government programs of up to $16 for each dollar spend on family planning programs
in Thailand for the period 1972–2010 (the ratio is 7:1 for the first nine years of the program)
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Family Planning Is a Good Investment 
The FP–MDG analyses make clear What key decisionmakers might not children each and unmet need for family
that family planning saves lives and realize is that family planning also planning among married women is only 
resources. Family planning can delay plays a valuable complementary role about 9 percent.5  
the onset of ﬁ rst pregnancy, prevent in reaching the other MDGs. Helping 
unintended pregnancies, and promote couples achieve their desired family The FP–MDG analyses, presented in 
birth spacing—thereby reducing size by promoting contraceptive use Figures 1 and 2, consider the costs 
abortions, giving women time to recover helps to reduce total fertility and, for satisfying unmet need for family 
between pregnancies, and limiting ultimately, slows rapid population planning and for achieving selected 
women’s lifetime risk of maternal death. growth. A smaller population means indicators for the MDG targets—such 
Further, family planning can reduce fewer people in need of education as net enrollment ratio in primary 
the number of infant and child deaths (MDG 2) and health services (MDGs education, proportion of children age 
by reducing the proportion of high-risk 4–6), and less strain on the environment one immunized against measles, and 
births. Healthier mothers are also better and natural resources (MDG 7). Thus, proportion of the population with access 
able to provide for the nutrition and care full achievement of the MDG targets to an improved water source/sanitation. 
of their babies after delivery. costs less and is more manageable 
logistically. For El Salvador, cost savings in meeting 
These facts are supported by the FP– the selected MDG indicators outweigh 
MDG analyses. In 2005, 11 countries Countries across the spectrum of the additional costs for family planning 
accounted for 65 percent of all maternal demographic situations and by a factor of 13 to 1. In Kenya, the 
deaths.2  The Health Policy Initiative has development needs can realize beneﬁ t-cost ratio is lower (4 to 1) due 
completed analyses for nine of these signiﬁ cant returns on their investment to the costs associated with satisfying a 
countries: Bangladesh, Democratic in family planning. A comparison of higher current level of unmet FP need 
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, India, countries as diverse as Kenya and El and other factors. However, by investing
Indonesia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Salvador illustrates this point. In Kenya, in family planning, Kenya would 
Tanzania.3 Gradually satisfying unmet women still have, on average, about 5 realize a signiﬁ cant net savings of about 
need for family planning by 2020 in children each, and surveys show that US$200 million from 2005–2015. 
these nine countries would save the the unmet need for FP services is high 
lives of more than 225,000 women and (about 25 percent of married women If costs were to be projected for 
avert about 10.6 million child deaths. of reproductive age want to space or additional indicators of the MDG targets
Thus, family planning helps countries limit births but are not currently using and beyond the year 2015, countries’ 
reduce child mortality (MDG 4) and any method of family planning).4 In El potential savings from investing in 
improve maternal health (MDG 5). Salvador, women have, on average, 2.9 family planning would be even greater. 
Figure 1. Social Sector Cost Savings and Family 
Planning Costs in El Salvador, 2005–2015 
Figure 2. Social Sector Cost Savings and Family 
Planning Costs in Kenya, 2005–2015 
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Figure 14: Social Sector Cost Savings and Family Planning Costs in Kenya, 2005–2015
Source: USAID Health Policy Initiative (2009b)
(Chao and Allen 1984).
Estimates along the above lines are frequently used to argue that “Family planning is
a good investment” (Bongaarts and Sinding 2011a; UN Population Division 2009; USAID
Health Policy Initiative 2009b) because social cost savings as a result of reduced fertility
and improved health outcomes significantly exceed the expenditures on family planning
programs. However, it is important to note that the estimates of these social cost savings
mostly result from “accounting” for lower fertility and improved health outcomes; these es-
timates do generally not reflect that reduced fertility ay results in shifts from child quan-
tity to chil quality, which is likely to i crease demands for schooling an potentially other
health services. Henc , the social costs s vings hig lighted in Fi ure 14 and relates studies
may be mislea ing in terms of reductions in social costs if family planning programs also
result—as is suggested by much of the recent literature—in shifts in the demand for child
quality (including for instance child health and schooling) (Section 3.2).
6.3. Benefits II: Evaluating Reduced Infant and Ma ernal Mort l ty
The recent research nd policy literature on family planning emphasizes the positive re-
productive health outcomes associated with increased availability of contraceptives that
allows women and couples to satisfy unmet need (Cleland et al. 2012). Table 3, for exam-
ple, reports findings from the above-mentioned Guttmacher Institute report (Singh et al.
2010), arguing that in 2008 modern contraceptive use prevented 188 million unintended
pregnancies, 1.2 million newborn deaths, and 230,000 maternal deaths and other nega-
tive health outcomes that would have occurred in the absence of any modern method use.
According to this report, expanding family planning programs so that (current) unmet
need were fulfilled would result in 640,000 fewer newborn deaths, 150,000 fewer maternal
deaths (more than 50,000 fewer from unsafe abortion and more than 90,000 fewer from
other pregnancy-related causes), and 600,000 fewer children who lose their mother. The
report also estimates that satisfying un et need results in 36 million fewer healthy years
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Table 3: Benefits resulting from modern contraceptive use among women who want to
avoid a pregnancy, according to contraceptive use scenario, 2008
Source: Singh et al. (2010)
Measure (000s) Current Fulfillment of
use of unmet need
modern for modern
methods methods Total
Unintended
pregnancies averted 187,800 53,460 241,260
Unplanned births 53,550 21,820 75,370
Abortions 112,310 24,800 137,100
Miscarriages 21,940 6,840 28,780
Deaths averted
Newborn 1,170 640 1,810
Maternal 230 150 380
Children who would
not become orphans 740 600 1,340
Women 24,640 12,430 37,070
Newborns 46,350 23,710 70,060
No. contraceptive
users 603,090 214,450 817,540
DALYs saved
of life lost (12 million fewer among women and 24 million fewer among newborns) (for
related analyses, reaching generally similar conclusions, see Ahmed et al. 2012). In a re-
lated study, Ross and Blanc (2012) decomposes declines in maternal morality into the con-
tributions resulting from changes in the numbers of women, the number of births, and
fertility rates, concluding that declines in fertility averted approximately 1.7 million ma-
ternal deaths in developing countries during 1990–2008, corresponding to a 54% reduction
in the maternal mortality rate. Relating fertility declines to changes in contraceptive use,
Cleland et al. (2012) argues—with some leap of faith in terms of inferring causal relation-
ships from observed associations—that, because increased contraceptive use accounts for
73% of the fertility decline, about 40% in the reduction in the maternal mortality rate is due
to contraception. In analyses that control for potential confounders, Cleland et al. (2012)
furthermore estimate that for each percentage point increase in contraceptive use, the ma-
ternal mortality rate decreased by 4.3 deaths per 100,000 births. Analyses of Demographic
and Health Survey data furthermore suggest that about one third of maternal deaths in de-
veloping countries is preventable if the unmet need for family planning were satisfied and
all women wanting to stop childbearing used effective contraception (Collumbien et al.
2004; Singh et al. 2010). Nevertheless, this progress in reduced maternal mortality—both
in terms of risk per birth and the total number of maternal deaths—has occurred relatively
unevenly within developed countries. For example, Ross and Blanc (2012) point out that,
to date, SSA has experienced minimal declines in maternal deaths, resulting from the com-
bined effect of increases in the number of women at risk and small declines in fertility and
mortality. In addition to reducing maternal mortality, increased contraceptive use has been
associated with reduced infant mortality, primarily as a result of reducing the frequency of
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relatively short birth intervals (Hobcraft et al. 1984; Rutstein 2005) and better child health
outcomes (Dewey and Cohen 2007). Cleland et al. (2012) conclude based on a review the
existing literature that the infant mortality rate would fall by about 10%, and mortality of
children aged 1–4 by about 20%, if all children were spaced by a gap of at least two years.
Given the fact that some empirical evaluations of family planning programs have doc-
umented effects of these programs on infant mortality (e.g., Joshi and Schultz 2007), but
not in all cases where the effect on mortality was investigated (e.g., Miller 2010), it is diffi-
cult to evaluate if these specific assumptions about positive reproductive health outcomes
from contraceptive use and satisfying unmet need in the above studies are realistic and
reflect causal estimates of family planning programs (Section 3.4) rather than merely ob-
served associations. Skeptical readers of the above evidence are likely to worried that the
above analyses of the number of maternal and infant/child death averted as a result of
increased contraceptive use are overestimates since they are mostly derived from correla-
tional studies that may not necessarily provide estimates of causal effects (for a discussion
of these estimation issues, see Schultz 2010). Nevertheless, the recent economic literature
on the careful evaluation of family planning programs reviewed in Section 3.4, suggests
a relatively convincing basis for concluding that positive health benefits for children and
mothers of family planning programs do indeed exist, and that these positive effects persist
after controlling for possibly endogeneity of contraceptive use. But these micro-studies are
difficult to generalize to SSA or all developing countries for obtaining benefit-cost ratios.
Hence, while acknowledging the potential limitations of these estimates for the benefit-
cost analyses in this paper, we take the estimates in Singh et al. (2010) at face value, and
evaluate the value of life according to the Copenhagen Consensus 2012 guidelines with
$1,000 per DALY, 3% discounting and life expectancy at birth (for newborn deaths) and at
age 28 (for maternal deaths). In this case, the expansion of family planning programs to
cover current unmet need in developing countries results in total benefits of $110 billions.
Given costs of satisfying the current unmet need of $3.6 billion, these calculations suggests
a benefit-cost ratio of about 30:1 for the expansion of family planning programs to cover
unmet need. This benefit cost ratio rises to 50:1 if the DALYs saved reported in Table 3 are
valued at $5,000, and the benefit-cost ratios would even be higher if the average costs of
service provision, rather than the marginal costs of satisfying unmet need, were used in
the calculations. However, these benefit-cost ratios are overestimates to the extent that the
causal impacts of family planning programs are less than those estimated in Singh et al.
(2010) and assumed in the above calculations.
6.4. Benefits III: Life-cycle, distributional and intergenerational benefits of family planning
programs
In addition to the effect of family planning programs towards reducing fertility and reduc-
ing maternal/child mortality, these programs have been shown to result in higher levels of
female (mother’s) education, improvements in women’s general health (e.g., as indicated
by BMI) and longer-term survival, increases in female labor force participation and earn-
ings, increased child health (up and beyond the effect on reducing child mortality) and
increased child human capital (including higher schooling levels) (e.g., Joshi and Schultz
2007; Miller 2010; Schultz 2009; see Section 3.4 for a detailed discussion). Several of these
program effects will affect individual’s well-being because in large-scale family planning
programs—the only ones that we evaluate here—these effects will make contributions to
economic growth, which in turn will affect future income levels. The benefits resulting
from increased economic growth—including (at least partially) the effects of improved
health, human capital, female labor force participation and higher female earnings—will
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be considered in the next section. In addition, all of the above program effects will gen-
erally be considered desirable and beneficial because they reduce inequality, including
gender inequality, contribute to an improved status of women, possibly reduce poverty,
and potentially increase subjective well-being among adults (and especially females) and
children. Nevertheless, within the current framework and given the available empirical
evidence, it will be impossible to explicitly evaluate the benefits of these effects in terms of
our benefit-cost calculations up-and-beyond their contributions to economic growth that
are considered below.
6.5. Benefits IV: Contributions of reduced fertility on per-capita income growth
The macro-level interactions between population growth and economic developments are
among the key considerations in evaluating the potential benefits of investments in family
planning programs. But despite decades of research on this topic with shifting consensus
opinions (see Section 3.3), this aspect remains challenging to evaluate. We review, and then
evaluate, in this section some of the prevailing perspectives. It is important to keep in
mind that, even if we conclude below that benefit-cost ratios of family planning programs
are likely to be significantly larger than one with respect to contributions to per-capita in-
come growth, one should not have illusions about the ability of such programs to reduce
global inequalities in income levels between developed and developing countries, or even
between the least and other less developed countries. The contribution of reduced popu-
lation growth to economic growth, pale in light of the about 20-fold differences in income
levels that exist in global comparison. Hence, family planning program are not likely to be
a substitute for other development efforts.
To start the discussion of the potential benefits of family planning programs and re-
duced fertility in terms of economic growth, we initially focus on arguments made by
policy-oriented organizations advising SSA governments, NGOs and international donors
such as USAID. For example, to assess the potential contributions of reduced fertility
on per-capita income growth, the USAIDS-funded Health Policy Initiative (http://www.
healthpolicyinitiative.com/) that has developed a a computer-based tool RAPID (USAID
Health Policy Initiative 2009c). This tool allows stakeholders to “demonstrate the effect of
rapid population growth on different sectors and the benefits of [family planning] programs”. The
description of the program states: “The model combines socioeconomic indicators—such as labor
force participation, primary school enrollment, and number of nurses per capita—with demographic
information and population projections to estimate impacts up to 30 years into the future. Different
scenarios are projected so that policymakers can compare the consequences if the country/region con-
tinues to have high fertility vs. the benefits of reducing fertility, in part, through [family planning]
programs.” In recent publications, in collaboration with the respective governments, this
model has been used to assess the contributions of population and family planning pro-
grams to development in several low income countries, including Kenya, Malawi, Uganda
and Zambia (Government of Kenya 2010; Government of Malawi 2010; Uganda Minstry of
Finance, Planning and Economic Development 2010; Zambia Ministry of Finance and Na-
tional Planning 2010). Figure 15 illustrates differential per capita GDP growth associated
with differential fertility rate in RAPID model, indicating that the low fertility scenario
results in an almost 40% higher GDP per capita in 2037 as compared to the high fertil-
ity scenario. In the low fertility scenario, per capita GDP per capita grows by 3.6% p.a.,
compared to 2.5% in the high fertility scenario. The per person net present value of this in-
creased per capita GDP is close to $1,500, and using earlier estimates of the family planning
investments required to achieve the reduced fertility (Section 6.1), the benefit-cost ratio in
the order of magnitude of 60:1 as a result of increased GDP per capita alone. The USAID
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However, as pointed out in Vision 2030, “. . . few countries have achieved and maintained real 
economic growth rates in excess of 6 percent or more over a quarter century.” Alternatively, 
Vision 2030 offers a baseline scenario that assumes a constant real growth rate of 6 percent 
per annum (again expressed in constant 2000 US$ to permit comparisons). This assumption also 
happens to be in line with recent economic performance.
At that rate of growth, GDP per capita would rise only to US$802 in 2037 with continued high 
fertility, and Zambia still would not have achieved middle-income status. In comparison, with 
declining fertility, GDP per capita would increase more rapidly to $610 in 2022 and $1,121 in 
2037, with the country at least reaching the bottom rungs of middle-income status (see Chart 24). 
Sources: World Bank, 2008; and projections prepared for this analysis using the 
Spectrum System of Policy Models, 2009.
Chart 24. GDP per Capita Based on 6% Economic Growth Rate
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Figure 15: RAPID model simulation: Zambia GDP per capita as a function of fertility
trends based on 6% aggregate economic growth rate
Note: The high fertility scenario assumes a modest decline of the total fertility rate from 6.2 in 2007 to 5.8 in 2037;
the low fertility scenario assumes a decline to a TFR of 2.2.
Source: Zambia Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2010)
Health Policy Initiative report therefore concludes, consistent with these high returns to
investments in family planning during the next decades, that “[t]he Zambian vision to be-
come a middle-income country can best be achieved by a combination of fast economic growth and a
slower rate of population growth”. Very similar conclusions are attained in USAID Health Pol-
icy Initiative reports for other higher fertility low income countries (Government of Kenya
2010; Government of Malawi 2010; Uganda Minstry of Finance, Planning and Economic
Development 2010; Zambia Ministry of Finance and National Planning 2010).
If the analyses and the interpretation that are illustrated in Figure 15 in the case for
Zambia are correct, the adoption of a family planning program would result in significant
economic gains in terms of a more rapid growth of income resulting from reduced fertility.
However, how is this more rapid growth of GDP per capita achieved, and is it broadly
realistic? Reading the underlying documentation of the RAPID model reveals:
“The effect of rapid population growth on economic growth depends on a number of
factors. It has been difficult for those who study it to find unambiguous connections
because many of the factors that influence economic growth vary across countries just as
population growth rates do. The variety of issues [has been] examined by the National
Research Council in a 1986 study (National Research Council 1986). [...] Since many
of these issues are too complex to treat in a short policy presentation, the RAPID model
uses only relationships that are well understood and easy to describe. The basic model
focuses on three basic concepts: dependency, the requirement for new jobs and per capita
output.” (USAID Health Policy Initiative 2009a, p. 13)
In terms of modeling assumptions, this implies that the rate of aggregate GDP growth is as-
sumed to be independent of population growth—and set to 6% for the calculations shown
in Figure 15. As a result, reductions in the rate of population growth directly translate
into increases per capita income, and while GDP per capita differs, both fertility scenar-
ios in Figure 15 assume and identical aggregate GDP. Moreover, while the documentation
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reflects the considerable uncertainty surrounding the assumption about the interaction be-
tween economic growth and population growth, the above-cited documents targeted at
policy makers (Figure 15) present a much more clear-cut connection between reduced pop-
ulation growth and more rapid per capita income growth.
In light of recent research on the interaction between population growth and economic
growth (see Section 3.3), how realistic are the calculations in Figure 15 and related reports
about the economic returns (measured in terms of GDP per capita growth) of reduced
fertility and investments in human capital? Are there reasons to believe that benefit-cost
ratios in the order of 60:1 are realistic in the area of per capita GDP growth over several
decades?
In order to shed light on this question, the linkages between economic growth and
changes in the population size and structure needs to be made explicit. One possible ap-
proach is provided by Ashraf et al. (2011), who revisit the above question about the extent
to which economic measures such as GDP per capita would change in response to reduc-
tions of fertility. Specifically, the model tries to account for four different effects through
which population size and age structure may affect economic growth (see also Section 3.3).
The first two focus on the role of the population size: a Malthusian effect, reflecting the the
congestion of fixed factors, such as land, through population growth; a Solow effect that
captures the capital shallowing resulting from a growth in the labor force. In addition,
several channels reflect potential effects of changes in the age structure the population and
capture potential demographic dividends (see also Section 3.3): a dependency effect that cap-
tures that, in a high-fertility environment, a reduction in fertility leads, at least temporarily,
to a higher ratio of working-age adults to dependents and—if income per worker is held
constant—mechanically raises income per capita; a life-cycle savings effect that captures that
a concentration of population in their working years may raise national saving, feeding
through to higher capital accumulation and higher output; an experience effect that captures
the shift of the working age population to higher ages, i.e., towards individuals with more
experience and potentially higher productivity; a life-cycle labor supply effect reflects that la-
bor force participation may increase as a result of differential participation rates when the
age structure shifts to older ages, and a child care effect reflects increases in female labor
supply as a result of reduced fertility; finally, a child quality effect reflects that reductions in
fertility may result in a quality-quantity trade-off, and increased child quality may foster
economic growth. The model does not include one additional potential effect, a Boserup
effect that would capture direct effects of the population size on productivity, for instance
through economies of scale or induced institutional change.
Figure 16 shows the results for the development of GPD per capita (light blue line)
along with some related indicators for two scenario: First, an immediate decline of the
TFR by 1 (from 5.32 to 4.32) that is compared to the TFR remaining constant at the 2005
level of 5.3. Second, a future trend of the TFR that follows the UN low scenario as com-
pared to the medium scenario, resulting in a 12% smaller population as compared to the
medium scenario. The surprising result from the simulations in Ashraf et al. (2011), which
are based on an explicit economic model that includes interactions between economic de-
velopment and the size and age-structure of the population—is that the findings are very
consistent with the conclusions obtained from the RAPID model reviewed above (see also
Figure 15). In the top panel of Figure 16, GDP per capita is about 26% higher after 50 year
is the TFR declines by one child as compared to constant fertility. Since the population
size is also about 25% lower in this case as compared to the constant fertility scenario, over
the course of 50 years the more rapid growth in GDP per capita after a decline in TFR es-
sentially mirrors the less rapid growth in the size of the population. A similar conclusion
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(a) Instant reduction of TFR by 1.0 (from TFR = 5.32 to TFR = 4.32)
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Figure 8: The Base Case Intervention Scenario
2008). It is hard to believe that mega cities such as Lagos do not already have sufficient size
to achieve economies of scale in production.
On a more prosaic level, we were not able to find quantitative estimates of the size
of Boserup effects that we could incorporate into our model.
3.5.2 Effects Through Health Improvements
Another channel through which fertility declines could possibly affect output is through
improvements in health. These could result from the same quality-quantity shift that we
model in the case of education. Ashraf et al. (2008) discuss how improvements in health
can be translated quantitatively into productive human capital. However, Joshi and Schultz
find no effect of the fertility intervention in Matlab, Bangladesh on child health.
4 Basic Results
Figure 8 shows the paths of physical capital per worker, human capital per worker, labor
input per worker, income per worker, and income per capita in our simulation, using the base
case parameters discussed above. As in all the figures that follow, we show results relative
to a baseline in which no fertility intervention takes place.
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(b) Reduction in Fertility from UN medium to UN low scenario
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Figure 28: The Base Case Scenario for the UN Exercise
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40
Figure 16: The effect of reduced fertility on eco omic growth in a unified growth model
calibrated to Nigeria.
Notes: Top panel: Instant reduction of TFR by 1.0 (from TFR = 5.32 to TFR = 4.32); after 50 years, the population
is 25% smaller than under constant fertility. Bottom panel: Reduction in Fertility fro UN medium to UN low
scenario; by 2050, the population in the low fertility scenario is 12% below that of the medium scenario.
Source: Ashraf et al. (2011)
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follows from the simulations that compare the UN low fertility scenario with the UN me-
dian fertility scenario. In the low fertility scenario, the population in 2050 is about 12%
below that implied by the medium scenario. The simulations in Ashraf et al. (2011) asso-
ciate with this less rapid growth in population a 12% higher GDP per capita (Figure 16,
bottom panel). In summary, therefore, the analyses by Ashraf et al. (2011) suggest that,
across two simulations with very different population and economic growth rates, an ap-
proximate calculation in which reductions in population growth rate increase growth in
GDP per capita almost one-for-one is fairly accurate over a 50 year horizon.19 And while
the analyses by the USAID Health Policy Initiative using the RAPID model (see above) can
be correctly criticized for not having an explicit economic model that informs the contribu-
tion of demographic changes to economic growth, the conclusions in Figure 15 (and related
country studies) about the connection between reduced population growth and higher per
capita GDP are remarkably consistent with the analyses by Ashraf et al. (2011) (Figure 16).
If this were indeed the case, the benefit-cost ratios in terms of GDP per capita of would be
on the order of magnitude of 60:1 over a 50 year horizon—as we’ve calculated above for
Zambia—if reducing the population growth by 1% during this period would have present
per capita value costs of around 20–30% of per capita GDP—an assumption that seems
quite plausible given the calculation of family planning program costs above.20
In addition to relying on results of simulation models such as in Ashraf et al. (2011),
we can ask if our knowledge of the interactions between population growth and economic
development, and in particular, our knowledge of the potential impacts of changing ages
structures, are consistent with the above interpretations (Bloom and Canning 2008; Bloom
et al. 2007a,b, 1998; Kelley and Schmidt 2005; Kelley 1995) (see also Section 3.3). Eastwood
and Lipton (2011) provide a detailed discussion of the implications of this literature for un-
derstanding the potential of a demographic dividend in sub-Saharan Africa. In particular,
the recent literature on the demographic dividend has estimated versions of models of the
form g(Y/N) = φ+ Xβ+ δ(Y/L) + γg(WA/N), where g(.) denotes the growth rate, Y is
output, N is the population size, L is the size of the labor force, Y/L is output per worker,
(WA) is the population in working ages, and WA/N is the fraction of the population in
working ages. γ indicates the effect of changes in age in the proportion of the population
in working ages—which tends to increase as fertility declines—on per capita income. Es-
timates for γ range from 1.5 to 3.5, with the higher of these figures obtained for African
countries (e.g., Bloom et al. 1998, Table 6). Are these estimates possibly consistent with an
interpretation such as in Figure 15 (and also Figure 16) that reduced rates in population
growth almost one-for-one translate into increased per capita growth?
For Zambia, for example, the projected population growth rate during 2010–60 is 3.29%
in the UN high fertility scenario, and 2.73% in the UN low fertility scenario; the low fer-
tility scenario thus implies a .56 percentage point lower growth rate. In the high fertility
scenario, the growth in the fraction of the population at working ages (16–65) is 0.121%,
and in the low fertility scenario this growth rate increases to 0.292% (a difference of .171
19We emphasize that these calculations are “approximate” in the sense that there is considerable uncertainty
about this conclusion. While the model Ashraf et al. (2011) is based on the most recent developments in growth
theory (see Section 3.3) that is calibrated to a SSA context, an assessment of the aggregate consequences of fertility
declines based on remains subject to important uncertainties about the parameter values used in the simulation
as well as about the mechanisms for the interactions between population change and economic development that
are postulated as part of the model.
20The calculation assumes that GDP per capita grows at 3–4% p.a., and that a reduction in population growth
would increase the rate of GDP per capita growth by 1 percentage point. The gain in GDP per capita is discounted
at 3%. Even if GDP per capita were constant in the presence of more rapid population growth, the benefit-cost
ratio would be 60:1 if population growth could be reduced over the 50 year horizon at a cost of about 10% of GDP
per capita.
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percentage points). A parameter value of γ of close to 3, which has for instance been es-
timated for SSA by Bloom et al. (1998), would imply that the more rapid growth in the
fraction of the population in the low fertility scenario results in a more rapid growth of
GDP per capita of about .51%—a value that corresponds closely to the reduced population
growth rate that is implied by the low fertility scenario as compared to the high fertility
scenario. Very similar results also hold for other high fertility SSA countries (such as Nige-
ria).
There is considerable controversy about the validity of the country-level estimates of
the demographic dividends, that is, the the contribution of changing age structures to eco-
nomic growth. Some of these concerns are of an econometric nature (Schultz 2010), while
others question the applicability of the Asian experience—which is an important driver of
the empirical results—to SSA. Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, if one takes the
existing estimates of a demographic dividend (γ in the above notation) at their face value,
they are consistent with our earlier discussions of Figures 15 and 16 and an approximate
calculation that reductions in population growth translate one-to-one into increased rates
of per capita GDP growth. If this is indeed the case, family planning programs are asso-
ciated with significant benefit-cost ratios in terms of per capita income growth, possibly
in the order of magnitude to 60:1 or higher. In interpreting this benefit-cost calculation,
however, it is important to emphasize that the evidence underlying such benefit-cost cal-
culations for the effect of family planning programs on increased growth of GPD per capita
remains tenuous at best, and that there remains considerable uncertainty about the magni-
tude these effects that is very difficult to evaluate at this point.
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: A RANGE OF BENEFIT-COST RATIOS FOR
POLICIES TARGETED AT REDUCING POPULATION GROWTH
Concerns about continued population growth in some of the least developed countries are
well founded. Current high fertility countries (Figure 4) account currently for about 38%
of the 78 million persons that are added annually to the world population, despite the fact
that they are home to only 18% of the current world population. The current high fertility
countries will make the largest contribution to the annual increment of the world popu-
lation after 2018, and after 2060, world population is projected to grow exclusively as a
result of population growth in the current high fertility countries (Figure 6). In the words
of Lee (2009), “[it would seem] so obvious: Larger, more rapidly growing populations have fewer
natural resources per person, less physical capital per worker, more dependents, and greater needs
for new social infrastructure. Of course they must be economically worse off.” And if this is
the case, family planning programs that facilitate a decline in fertility and a reduction in
population growth rate would seem potentially highly beneficial interventions that should
be expanded. And yet, this conclusion has been the subject of a long-standing and some-
times heated debate, often questioning the basic pillars of this conclusion (Kaiser 2011): For
example, how detrimental, if at all, is population growth for economic development, indi-
vidual well-being and the attainment of development indicators such as the Millennium
Development Goals? Do family planning programs have causal effects towards reducing
fertility, or would observed declines in family planning program areas also have been ob-
served in the absence of these programs? Is there a window of opportunity in the next
decades in which declines in population growth rates as a result of reduced fertility could
provide a “demographic dividend” that would facilitate the social and economic development
in some of the world’s most underdeveloped countries?
And while research in the last two decades has substantially strengthened the case for
Hans-Peter Kohler
Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012
Population Growth 57
family planning programs—documenting for example significant effects of these programs
towards reducing fertility, increasing female (mother’s) education, improving women’s
general health and longer-term survival, increases in female labor force participation and
earnings, increased child health and increased child human capital (Section 3.4)—the at-
tempt to obtain reasonably reliable estimates of the benefits, costs and benefit-cost ra-
tios of these programs remains very challenging—or possibly almost impossible—given a
plethora of estimation problems, a limited knowledge of program costs, and an even more
difficult task of assessing the micro- and macro-level benefits of these programs (see Sec-
tions 3.3–3.4). And, of course, in the implementation of family planning programs many
questions related the optimal design of such programs are important Mwaikambo et al.
(2011); Population Council (2012); Prata (2009), including the appropriate integration of
family planning programs with other health interventions, the adjustment to specific lo-
cal contexts, the potential needs for health-systems strengthening, and the combination
of family planning programs with information campaigns, behavioral change communica-
tion and interpersonal counseling. Negotiating population policies within specific political
contexts is also non-trivial and can be challenging (Chimbwete et al. 2005; May 2012; Robin-
son 2012). These specific aspects of program implementation and negotiation are beyond
the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, in this section, we attempt to establish benefit-cost
considerations based on the existing evidence, and then discuss the sensitivity of these
results with respect to several sources of errors.
The costs of family planning programs in the past have varied widely (Section 6.1), and
so do estimates of the costs of expanding family planning services in the current high fer-
tility countries (Figure 4) that have the largest unmet need for such programs. Given the
need to expand health systems and related infrastructures, the costs of expanding access to
family planning per additional user are thought to exceed—at least in the short- to medium
term—the average costs per current user in SSA contexts. Recent estimates, for example,
suggest that additional annual expenditure of $3.6 billions would allow expansion of fam-
ily planning services to all women who currently have an unmet need. Arguably most
useful for the present benefit-cost calculations are estimates of the family planning costs
related to attaining the UN population forecasts (Moreland et al. 2010), which suggest that
a reduction in the SSA population growth rate by 1 percentage point during 2005–50 would
entail discounted family planning costs in the order of magnitude of about $27 billion (or
about 3% of current SSA GDP) (see Section 6). These estimates do not consider potentially
necessary expansions of health systems that might be necessary to increase the family plan-
ning provisions to the required levels and possible costs of generating the demand for fam-
ily planning (Population Council 2012), and so actual program costs may be significantly
higher—however, based on the literature, it is difficult to make precise conclusions about
the costs of these additional investments, which almost certainly, are context specific and
highly variable across countries.
In terms of benefits, our discussion has focused on four categories. First, benefits that
result from the fact that family planning programs may reduce expenditures on social pro-
grams as a result of a less rapidly growing size of birth cohorts, with savings including
a reduced need for expanding the school system, providing education, implementing im-
munization programs or providing health care for children. However, these savings may
potentially be misleading as in terms of reductions in social costs if family planning pro-
grams also result—as is suggested by much of the recent literature—in shifts in the demand
for child quality (including for instance child health and schooling) and increases in female
education (Section 3.2). Because the net effect is unclear, we do not consider these benefits
in our benefit-cost calculations.
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Second, benefits of family planning programs occur because reduced fertility, increased
child spacing and possible reductions in unwanted fertility are likely to reduce both infant
and maternal mortality. Some recent estimates of the reduction in child and maternal mor-
tality that would result from expanding family planning programs to satisfy current unmet
nee suggest benefit-cost ratios in the order of magnitude of 30:1 to 50:1 resulting from the
reduction in child and maternal mortality alone (Section 6.3). Some caution, however, is
necessary in interpreting these numbers since it is not clear to what extent these estimates
reflect the causal impact of expanding family planning programs on child/maternal mor-
tality.
Third, our analyses have emphasized that family planning programs—in addition to
reducing fertility and, related, maternal and child mortality—are likely to result in higher
levels of female education, improvements in women’s general health, increases in female
labor force participation and earnings, increased child health (up and beyond the effect on
reducing child mortality) and increased child human capital (see Section 3.4). Several of
these factors will affect economic growth, and will therefore be considered as part of the
benefits considered below. And while these consequences are likely to be desirable from
a policy perspective up and beyond their contributions to economic growth, we will not
consider these additional life-cycle, distributional and intergenerational benefits of family
planning program due to the difficulties in evaluating them within the framework of this
paper.
Fourth, and finally, benefits of large-scale family planning programs may result from
changes in population dynamics, and in particular, from reductions in population growth
rates, increases in the proportion of the population at working ages, and increases in lev-
els of human capital and female labor force participation that result from reduced fertility
over the next decades. It is important to emphasize that these aggregate effects of family
planning programs—as of many other health interventions (Bleakley 2010)—are likely to
be small in light of the vast differences in income levels among less developed countries,
or between the least developed and more developed countries. Some recent discussions of
the contribution of demographic change—and specifically declining fertility, age-structure
changes and demographic dividends—to economic development in SSA seem rather opti-
mistic in that regard (Sippel et al. 2011). Nevertheless, our review of the literature suggests
in Sections 3.3 and 6.5 suggests that reductions in population growth rates by 1 percent-
age point in current high fertility countries may result in increases of the growth rate of per
capita GDP by approximately 1 percentage point. This effect of reduced population growth
on economic development is about twice as large as the effect that was suggested in the Na-
tional Research Council (1986) report on Population Growth and Economic Development (see
Section 3.3).21 Given the uncertainty in the underlying models, the still limited knowledge
about population–development interactions, and the limitations of existing empirical esti-
mates, all of which have been subject to a long and at times heated discussion, this finding
is hardly more than a rule of thumb or back-of-the-envelope calculation. Nevertheless, if
this estimate that reductions in population growth rates by 1 percentage point in current
high fertility countries may result in increases of the growth rate of per capita GDP by
approximately 1 percentage point is broadly accurate, it would suggest substantial benefit-
21The conclusions in National Research Council (1986) state: “A simple model suggests that the effect is compara-
tively modest. Using a typical labor coefficient of 0.5 in estimated production functions, a 1 percent reduction in the rate of
labor force growth would boost the growth of per capita income by 0.5 percent per year.” Since the report did not consider
age structure effects, a the growth rate of the labor force is equal to that of the population. The reports conclusions
therefore continue: “Thus, after 30 years, a 1 percent reduction in the annual rate of population growth (produced, say,
by a decline in the crude birth rate from 37 to 27 per 1,000) will have raised production and income per capita to a level 16
percent [= exp(.005 * 30) - 1] above what it would otherwise have been.”
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Table 4: Summary of costs, benefits and benefit cost ratios for family planning programs
Annual benefits BCR
Benefit Component: Assumptions Billion USD Billion USD
Low (DALY = 1K) 110
3.6
30
High (DALY = 5K) 180 50
Low 216
3.6
60
High 360 100
Low 326
3.6
90
High 470 150
Annual Net Benefits and Costs
(3 per cent discount rate )
Annual costs of 
satisfying unmet 
need in 
developing 
countries
Reduced Infant and Maternal 
Mortality
Income Growth (including life cycle, 
distributional and intergenerational 
benefits)
Total, Family Planning programs 
(sum)
cost ratios for family planning programs, possibly in the magnitude of 60:1 to 100:1 (or
even higher) if the discounted costs of reducing population growth by 1 percentage in SSA
are indeed in the order of magnitude of less than 10% of current SSA GDP during the next
five decades (as is suggested by our discussion of the program costs above). The sizable
benefit-cost ratios essentially result from the fact that reductions in fertility and popula-
tion growth rates will result in sustained increases in GDP per capita over several decades
in these calculations, and the costs of achieving these reductions in fertility and popula-
tion growth are relatively modest when compared to current GDP levels in SSA and other
least developed countries. However, one should not be mistaken about the magnitude of
these aggregate economic effects in terms of closing substantial the income gap between
the least developed countries and other developing or even developed countries. While
these aggregate effects of family planning programs are likely to contribute substantially
and favorably to the benefit-cost ratio of family planning programs, the aggregate effects
are too small for these programs to significantly reduce global income inequalities or to
provide a substitute for other development policies. More likely, a convincing case can be
made for integrating family planning programs with other development policies (APPG
2007; Canning 2012; Cleland et al. 2006; Eastwood and Lipton 2011; Global Aganda Coun-
cil on Population Growth 2012; Sippel et al. 2011; Teller and Hailemariam 2011; Wilcher
et al. 2009), including those that target reproductive-health concerns such as HIV/AIDS
or other infectious diseases (including specifically also those reducing infant/child mor-
tality) and/or development policies that would help create the institutional environment
to capture the demographic dividend from reduced population growth and changes in the
population age structure that are likely to occur in the next decades.
Combining the above estimates of the benefit-cost ratios for family planning programs
in the area of reducing maternal/child mortality and increasing income per capita suggest
benefit-cost ratios for investments in family planning programs of 90:1 to 150:1. Table 4
summarizes how these benefit-cost ratios arise from benefits in terms of reduced infant
and maternal mortality and income growth. High and low estimates for the former are
due to different evaluations of life, and in the latter, due to different costs of achieving
a specific reduction in fertility and population growth rates. The table also reports the
estimated costs of satisfying the total current unmet need for family planning in developing
countries, obtained from Singh et al. (2010) (see also Section 6.1), as well as the total benefits
resulting from this investment in family planning based on the benefit-cost ratios obtained
reported in this table.
Several caveats need to be emphasized when interpreting these favorable benefit-cost
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Figure 17: Robustness of benefit-cost calculations: benefit-Cost Ratio for family plan-
ning programs if costs are underestimated and/or benefits are overestimated by a factor
of up to 200%
ratios for family planning programs. On the one hand, since there is evidence that family
planning programs result in benefits that are not considered here, such as climate change,
environmental sustainability and political stability (Goldstone et al. 2012; O’Neill et al.
2010; Speidel et al. 2009; Sulston et al. 2012), one could argue that the actual benefit-cost
ratios are likely to be higher. On the other hand, we have emphasized throughout this
paper that, despite the progress in the literature during the last two decades, the empiri-
cal basis for conducting these benefit-cost calculations remains somewhat weak, and sig-
nificant uncertainty prevails in both the assessments of the costs of these programs and
their expansion, as well as in terms of the causal effects in terms a range of benefits that
these programs will produce. It is easy to argue that many biases in the existing literature
will tend to over-state the benefits resulting from family planning programs and under-
state the costs of these programs and their expansion (Sections 6.1–6.5). Thus, the above
benefit-cost ratios would tend to be over-estimates. Based on the current literature, it is
impossible to establish with confidence how large these biases might be. However, the
magnitude of the benefit-cost ratios for family planning programs that emerge from our
analyses, and the relatively convincing recent empirical micro- and macro-evidence about
the benefits resulting from family planning programs and reductions in fertility, a fairly
favorable assessment of family planning programs in terms of their benefit-cost ratios and
cost-effectiveness seems to be justified and relatively robust with respect to measurement
errors. For example, Figure 17 illustrates how a benefit-cost ratio of 120, which is the av-
erage of the high and low overall benefit-cost ratios reported in Table 4, would change if
the costs of family planning programs were underestimated, and/or the benefits of these
programs were overestimated, by a factor of up to 200% (i.e., if the costs were up to 3-times
as high, and/or the benefits were only 1/3 as high as is assumed in the current calculation
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of the benefit-cost ratios in Table 4). Even in the most pessimistic assumption in Figure
17 when the costs are 3-times as high and the benefits are only 1/3 as high as is currently
assumed in Table 4, the benefit-cost ratio are fairly favorable and in excess of 13:1; and,
of course, the benefit-cost ratios are higher if the underestimation of the costs and/or the
overestimation of the benefits is less pronounced.
In summary, therefore, the conclusion based on this review of the literature and as-
sessment of benefit-cost ratios for the expansion of family planning programs is quite con-
sistent with several related recent studies that have argued in favor of the expansion of
family planning programs (Ashraf et al. 2008; Babigumira et al. 2012; Chao 2005; Cleland
et al. 2006, 2012; Haveman 1976; Hubera and Harveya 1989; Joshi and Schultz 2007; Levine
et al. 2006; Miller 2010; Simmons et al. 1991; USAID Health Policy Initiative 2009b; Wulf
1981). Our discussion and benefit-cost analyses thus lend support to earlier analyses that
have argued that family planning programs are a good “economic investment” (Bongaarts
and Sinding 2011b) and the renewed emphasis on family planning programs in light of
continued population growth in some of the world’s least developed countries (Section 2)
is very much supported by the present analyses. In expanding family planning programs,
it is clear—and supported by a fairly broad consensus—that these programs must be vol-
untary and based on a long-term commitment of resources, and empirical studies suggest
that, in order to be effective, family planning programs are ideally integrated with other
reproductive and child health services, effective community-based programs and poten-
tially related behavioral change communication. There is also a rich body of empirical
evidence and experience that can inform the important open questions about the optimal
design and implementation of these programs (Section 3.4). And while the Expert Panel
of the Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012 Copenhagen Consensus Project (2012) did not
rank family planning programs particularly favorable in comparison with other proposed
interventions for confronting ten great contemporary global challenges, the readers of the
Slate Magazine Forum accompanying the Copenhagen Consensus 2012 Project ranked pop-
ulation growth and family planning as a top priority (Lomborg 2012a,b). Based on the
evidence reviewed in this paper, this author tends to agree with the Slate readers. Indeed,
as recently stated by Melinda Gates (2012b), “Let’s put birth control back on the agenda”.
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